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This thesis examines if increased Department of Defense (DOD) involvement in political 
warfare (PW) is justified through a qualitative, comparative analysis of U.S. PW actions 
conducted by the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and DOD in two 
Cold War cases: Italy from 1943–1948 and Chile from 1961–1973. Concepts of strategy 
and social movement models of Doug McAdam, Charles Tilly, and Sidney Tarrow are 
applied to historical PW actions, both overt and covert. The case-study analysis clarifies 
each agency’s conduct of PW and develops analytical tools to classify PW actions by 
approach and impact within the political setting. Data was collected from archives, 
declassified government documents, and expert analyses. Results indicate that, compared 
to other U.S. agencies, the DOD had a limited direct role in PW in the cases studied, but 
was an important enabler. In applying models of social movement theory to historical 
analysis, this thesis identifies and develops the contentious politics mobilization model’s 
potential use in planning and evaluating PW strategies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Defense (DOD) is the largest agency in the United States 
government with over 1.4 million active-duty personnel and 718,000 civilian employees.1 
At any given time, the DOD has approximately 450,000 members deployed or stationed 
overseas in more than 150 countries.2 By contrast, “the lead institution for the conduct of 
American diplomacy,” the Department of State (DOS), employs some 13,000 foreign-
service officers and around 45,000 locally employed staff at overseas posts.3 Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) employment numbers are classified; however, this study 
assumes CIA employment numbers are similar to those of the DOS. Comparing the three 
agencies, the Department of Defense—with its complex relationships with foreign 
governments, global presence, and personnel capacity—is an underutilized resource in 
current American political warfare and diplomacy strategy.  
Today’s policymakers and strategists have yet to tap the full potential of the 
Department of Defense’s political warfare (PW) capabilities where PW is defined as the 
employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national 
objectives in both covert and overt action.4 This thesis reveals how the Department of 
Defense contributed to political warfare during the Cold War, when political warfare was 
at its peak, and traces DOD involvement in combined DOD, CIA, and DOS political 
warfare efforts. This perspective will assist in identifying where current DOD capabilities 
may be applied to advance future political warfare strategies. In evaluating these Cold 
War cases, this thesis develops analytical frameworks using social movement theory and 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Defense, “About the Department of Defense,” U.S. Department of Defense, 
accessed March 16, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/about/. 
2 Defense Manpower Data Center, “Total Military Personnel and Dependent End Strength: By Service, 
Regional Area, and Country,” Excel Document (Defense Manpower Data Center, February 4, 2015), 
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil.; U.S. Department of Defense, “About the Department of Defense,” U.S. 
Department of Defense, accessed March 16, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/about/. 
3 “U.S. Department of State: Mission,” U.S. Department of State, February 16, 2014, 
http://careers.state.gov/learn/what-we-do/mission. 
4 George Kennan, “Policy Planning Staff Memorandum 269: National Security Council Meeting on 
Political Warfare May 4, 1948,” Memorandum (Washington, DC: National Security Council, May 4, 
1948), http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm. 
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strategy concepts to explain PW actions according to approach, target attribution, and the 
effects on a target’s political environment. 
Extensive research in the fields of political warfare and social movement theory 
has been conducted, but there is little information available that combines these areas of 
study. This thesis addresses this shortcoming by merging concepts from political warfare 
and social movement theory to develop a new conceptual framework with which to 
evaluate proposed political warfare. This framework can be applied in a variety of 
political environments and adapted to rapidly changing dynamics, and the models 
presented can be used to organize and evaluate future planning, assessment, and strategy. 
While this thesis focuses on historical practices in U.S. political warfare, it uses modern 
sociological theory as the analytical tool, applying social movement concepts to increase 
the potential application of political warfare and advance scholarship in this field.  
A. PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL WARFARE, 2015 
If one wants to define the future, one must study the past. 
—Confucius (551–479 BC) 
In June 2013, the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan think tank, 
published a memorandum on political warfare intended for policymakers and opinion 
leaders. Max Boot and Michael Doran, the memorandum’s authors, believe that “the U.S. 
government has gotten out of the habit of waging political warfare since the end of the 
Cold War.”5 They observe that U.S. foreign policy has focused more on public 
diplomacy efforts to “tell America’s story” than on substantively influencing foreign 
audiences for a U.S. strategic objective.6  
The problem is that no government agency- not the State Department, not 
the Pentagon, and not the CIA—views political warfare as a core mission. 
This gap is partially filled by the National Endowment for Democracy, the 
International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute, 
entities created during the Reagan administration to promote democracy 
                                                 
5 Max Boot and Michael Doran, “Political-warfare: Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 33,” Council 
on Foreign Relations, June 2013, 1, http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/political-warfare/p30894. 
6 Ibid. 
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abroad in an overt manner. But these organizations primarily focus on the 
procedures of democracy—training activists to conduct campaigns and 
elections—rather than trying to influence substantively who assumes 
power. That has rightly allowed them to maintain a neutral reputation but 
also leaves a yawning gap in the U.S. government’s capabilities.7 
This gap has contributed to a lack of focus, authority, and direction in all aspects 
of political warfare. It has made U.S. political leaders reactive to global events and reliant 
on coercive measures, such as overt military force and economic sanctions, to influence 
international opponents.8 In a speech at the National Defense University, President 
Obama asserted that the current overt, coercive, military-centered policy in foreign 
diplomacy runs the risk of creating enemies and undermines international public opinion 
of the United States.9 Rather than reacting to international political events, it may be time 
to learn from experience and take a robust, holistic approach to international diplomacy 
by exploring the entire spectrum of options. 
In the Cold War, the United States waged political warfare through a variety of 
mechanisms–for example, covert funding of noncommunist parties and anti-communist 
magazines, organizations, artists, and intellectuals in Europe and Latin America.10 
Although the Cold War is over, the practices and policies of that era may apply today.  
Boot and Doran suggest that political strategies and tactics developed during the 
Cold War could help the United States gain influence with foreign governments and 
undermine the current state and non-state enemies of the United States11 The authors 
discuss the current conflicts in the Middle East and argue that Cold War strategies may 
be used to combat Islamic-extremist organizations and ideologies and the governments 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 2. 
8 Max Boot and Michael Doran, “Department of Dirty Tricks,” Foreign Policy, June 28, 2013, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/28/department-of-dirty-tricks/. 
9 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University” (Fort McNair 
Washington, DC, May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-
president-national-defense-university. 
10 Boot and Doran, “Political-warfare: Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 33,” 2. 
11 Boot and Doran, “Department of Dirty Tricks.” 
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that support them.12 However, Boot and Doran believe the United States currently lacks 
the organizational framework for implementing an effective political warfare strategy.  
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
This thesis provides an assessment of political warfare during the Cold War to 
identify areas for increased Department of Defense involvement in the planning, 
development, and practice of political warfare. The following research questions are 
posed:  
1. How does DOD involvement in political warfare strategy and practice 
affect U.S. PW objectives?  
2. How can expanding the DOD’s role in political warfare increase the 
available policy options for today’s decision makers?  
3. What are some ways the DOD can support political warfare and its 
objectives?  
This thesis provides a definition of political warfare, offers strategy approaches 
with associated actions, and develops analytical tools to evaluate PW actions, contexts, 
and effects in the political environment. Applying the analytical frameworks based on 
social movement theory and strategy concepts to historic cases of PW can assist in 
identifying effective practices raising possibilities for increased DOD involvement today. 
The scope of this thesis is limited to political warfare, social movement theory, 
and cases of American political warfare during the Cold War. Kennan’s description of an 
overt and covert political warfare spectrum is combined with the concept of direct and 
indirect approaches to classify PW actions according to the approach implemented and 
the attribution of the action.  
Collective action has been one of the primary ways to achieve a political 
objective. The study of collective action is predominantly in the domain of sociology, 
psychology, anthropology, economics, and political science. This research uses the lens 
of sociology and political science as these fields emphasize the collective actions of state 
and non-state actors. Collective action models found within economics, psychology, and 
                                                 
12 Boot and Doran, “Political-warfare: Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 33,” 3. 
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anthropology are outside the scope of this research due to their narrower focus in research 
and collective action model development.  
Sociology offers many theories as to the processes involved in collective action. 
This study focuses on the “contentious politics mobilization” (CPM) model developed by 
Dough McAdams, Charles Tilly, and Sydney Tarrow. The CPM model pertains to a 
political environment wherein competing groups use collective action to achieve 
opposing political objectives. This model expands McAdam’s political process model, 
which explains collective action processes within a social movement, and identifies the 
processes contributing to group mobilization in a competitive political environment 
hosting multiple organizations. In such an environment, organizations, movements, and 
governments use a similar repertory of collective action processes to achieve legitimacy 
or maintain control over a population.  
The framework developed in this thesis adapts the CPM model for use in political 
warfare, enabling a PW actor to identify the general areas within a political environment 
that can be manipulated to achieve an objective. The new framework also identifies areas 
where an actor can assess the effectiveness of the PW strategy and adjust future actions to 
achieve the desired result.  
In the historical studies presented, the United States employed various techniques 
to prevent communist expansion and influence as revealed in the declassified documents 
consulted in this research. Of all the potential U.S. PW cases, this study chose Italy, from 
1943–1948, to illustrate the DOD contribution to PW in the transition from WWII to the 
Cold War. This is a case in which DOD involvement in a comprehensive political 
warfare strategy helped achieve long-term objectives through the successful manipulation 
of a political system. The Chile case, from 1961–1973, was selected to show DOD’s 
enduring contribution in bolstering a PW strategy that had failed to sustain its initial 
success. The Chile case illustrates DOD as an essential PW element to achieve the end 
objective after political system manipulation has failed. The Chilean case calls attention 
to the DOD’s covert and overt capabilities in achieving an immediate political warfare 
objective—one which, as some scholars suggest, yielded negative long-term effects.  
 6 
1. Theoretical Framework  
Social movement theory and strategy concepts are used to develop a theoretical 
framework for describing the approaches, attribution, impact, and effect of PW actions. 
These elements illuminate how political warfare is conducted and clarify the relationship 
between PW actions and the environment in which they are used.  
2. Approach and attribution 
To analyze political warfare actions by approach and attribution, a taxonomy is 
developed to categorize actions as direct, indirect, overt, or covert. These categories 
enable insights into the conduct of PW while differentiating among the approaches that 
individual PW actors may take, as seen in Figure 1. 
 




Figure 2 represents how McAdam et al.’s CPM model helps identify the areas 
where political warfare actions influence group mobilization, as well as the effect these 
action have on a target’s political environment. 
 
Figure 2.  The Contentious Politics Mobilization Model13 
To conceptualize a political setting, Charles Tilly’s polity model is used to 
provide a static visualization. This model, presented in Figure 3, defines a political space 
in terms of the boundaries between members, non-members, and outside actors. Applied 
to political warfare, the polity model identifies key actors, the approaches used by 
different actors, and existing and emerging coalitions. It also contributes to case analysis 
by linking U.S. PW approaches to specific actors or groups. The polity model can be used 
as a targeting tool to identify influential groups and organizations and visualize how they 
could be leveraged in PW.  
                                                 
13  Doug McAdam, Sidney G Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge; New 




Figure 3.  The Tilly Polity Model14 
3. Methodology 
A qualitative analysis of political warfare during the Cold War is conducted by 
identifying the actions of the CIA, DOS, and DOD using declassified cases in Italy 1943–
48 and Chile 1961–73. Political warfare actions are categorized by approach and impact 
on the political environment. This approach identifies positive and negative long-term 
effects as a basis for determining successful and unsuccessful political warfare practices.  
Both primary and secondary sources are used in evaluation. Primary sources 
include U.S. declassified diplomatic correspondence, instructions, and case analyses. 
Secondary sources consist of scholarly studies, interpretations, and reflections on the 
historical events associated with CIA, DOS, and the DOD actions, which are categorized 
according to the theoretical frameworks developed in this study. 
The result of the case analysis is a comparison of agency actions presented in 
tabular form using the theoretical framework categories as the categorization tool (see 
template in Table 1). Comparison among the agencies provides insight into their 
                                                 
14 Ibid. Modified image adding subjects arrow. 
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historical contribution, their typical roles in political warfare strategy, and the potential 
utility of the DOD in the present day political warfare environment. 
Table 1.   Case-Study Template 








Overt, Direct     
Covert, Direct     
Covert, Indirect     
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II. POLITICAL WARFARE AND APPROACH FRAMEWORK 
Political warfare is not new. Early writings on political warfare include Sun Tzu’s 
Art of War in 512 BC and Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War in 433 BC.15 
Sun Tzu writes, “To win a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest 
excellence; the highest excellence is to subdue the enemy’s army without fighting at 
all.”16 Political warfare can be thought of as those activities in preparation for war that 
use influence, coercion, and manipulation, rather than direct military force, to achieve 
political objectives.  
A. POLITICAL WARFARE DEFINED 
Ambassador George Kennan defines political warfare “as the employment of all 
the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.”17 The 
means for achieving the objective vary, depending upon the resources available, the 
intelligence gained by researching the target population, and the ideas and ingenuity of 
the political warfare planners.18 Political warfare focuses on “winning the war of 
ideas,”19 the “marshaling of human support, opposition, or energies”20 or “extending 
control over individual political entities, political groups or factions within the state, the 
nation state itself or even multinational groups.”21 Psychological processes are used to 
influence the actions of a target population. The political warfare actor’s ability to control 
or direct popular collective action or inaction within a target country is his primary way 
of achieving an objective.  
                                                 
15 Paul Smith Jr., On Political War, 1st ed. (National Defense University Press, 1989), 30, 
www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a233501.pdf. 
16 Wu Sun and Samuel Blair Griffith, Sun Tzu The Art of War: Translated (from the Chinese) and with 
an Introduction by Samuel B. Griffith, Etc. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971, 1971). 
17 Kennan, “Policy Planning Staff Memorandum 269,” 1. 
18 British Political-warfare Executive, The Meaning, Techniques, and Methods of Political-warfare 
(Great Britain: British Government, 1942), 11, http://www.psywar.org. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla, War: Ends and Means (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 77. 
21 Paul Blackstock, The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating The Politics of Other Nations, 1st ed. 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Book, 1964), 43. 
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According to Kennan, PW actions can range from straightforward alliances to 
clandestine support of an underground resistance in a hostile state; any and all 
instruments available to a nation’s command are potential means.22 Other experts 
highlight propaganda, agents of influence, sabotage, coups de main, economic sanctions, 
and support for foreign groups, as but a few examples.23 For the United States, the means 
of political warfare employed is related to which agency has the experience, resources, 
and responsibility to carry out an action. 
B. ORGANIZING U.S. POLITICAL WARFARE ACTORS 
Within the United States government, the primary agencies responsible for acts of 
overt and covert political warfare are the DOS, DOD, and CIA. Recognizing the need to 
coordinate agency efforts, Kennan established a governing board within the DOS to 
oversee all political warfare actions.24 The DOS became the lead organizer of PW 
actions, primarily focusing on overt actions. The CIA was responsible for covert acts in 
support of DOS strategy. The Department of Defense covered the range of actions, taking 
direction from the DOS when acting overtly and from the CIA when acting covertly; this 
ability to work across the spectrum made the DOD a valuable resource. Building upon 
Kennan’s coverage of overt and covert actions, the next section develops a framework to 
classify PW actions according to approach and target attribution.  
C. THE SPECTRUM OF POLITICAL WARFARE 
Generally, in battle, use the normal force to engage; use the extraordinary to win. 
—Sun Tzu (544–496 BC) 
Kennan’s description of PW covers the covert–overt spectrum but fails to 
describe all the approaches political warfare actors can take. To assess PW actions 
beyond the covert–overt spectrum, this study offers an analytical tool that adds direct and 
indirect elements of strategy.  
                                                 
22 Kennan, “Policy Planning Staff Memorandum 269,” 1. 
23 Seabury and Codevilla, War, 161. 
24 Kennan, “Policy Planning Staff Memorandum 269.” 
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D. DIRECT AND INDIRECT: CHENG AND CH’I  
This section introduces Sun Tzu’s concept of cheng and ch’i as a supplement to 
covert and overt concepts. Strategies of political warfare may have multiple approaches. 
Covert and overt classifications identify an action according to the target’s perception of 
the action. But perception alone provides only one aspect of how political warfare is 
conducted. Cheng is the direct approach, or Sun Tzu’s “normal force,” and ch’i is the 
indirect approach, or Sun Tzu’s “extraordinary force.”25 Application of these concepts 
allows PW actions to be categorized in four quadrants, as illustrated in Figure 4 (also 
presented in Figure 1 page 6).  
 
Figure 4.  The Political Warfare Spectrum  
The PW spectrum in Figure 4 classifies actions according to approach and 
attribution. The spectrum is not meant to suggest that PW objectives are achieved by 
limiting actions to a single type of approach. Instead, the combined actions of political 
warfare should include action from among all fields in the spectrum. In the words of Sun 
Tzu, “In battle there are only normal and extraordinary forces, but their combinations are 
                                                 
25 Sun and Griffith, Sun Tzu The Art of War, 91. 
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limitless; none can comprehend them all…the interactions are as endless as that of 
interlocking rings. Who can determine where one ends and the other begins?”26  
1. Overt, Direct Actions 
In Figure 4, the upper-left quadrant signifies actions that can be classified as overt 
and direct. Overt political warfare is any action conducted by the United States that is 
plainly or readily apparent, as opposed to secret or hidden. Direct actions are aimed 
directly toward a target, indicating a direct interaction between the target and the U.S. 
government or its entities. Examples of overt, direct PW action are alliances between 
countries, “white” propaganda, military buildup along a defined border, trade restrictions, 
and diplomatic conferences, messages, and announcements.  
2. Covert, Direct Actions 
The upper-right quadrant of the PW spectrum represents direct, covert actions. 
Covert political warfare is any action that can be attributed to a third party and does not 
directly implicate the actor’s involvement. One example of a direct, covert action is the 
CIA’s use of psychological warfare during operation PBSUCCESS to overthrow the 
Guatemalan government in 1954. The CIA set up a secret Florida based radio station to 
broadcast into Guatemala with programing implying the signal originated from an 
internal resistance movement. This type of action is called “black” propaganda. The radio 
station is owned and operated by an American agency, not a third party. Because the 
actor implementing the PW action is part of the U.S. government, its actions are direct 
U.S. actions. Another example of a direct, covert action is a military raid on infrastructure 
in a target country where an insurgent group could be blamed or framed for the action. 
The Russians conducted direct, covert actions in the Crimea by inserting professional 
military soldiers posing as Crimean separatists. 
                                                 
26 Sun and Griffith, Sun Tzu The Art of War, 138. 
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3. Covert, Indirect Actions 
The lower-right quadrant represents covert, indirect political warfare actions. 
Indirect PW is conducted through an intermediary not associated with the U.S. 
government. The intermediary, wittingly or unwittingly, conducts actions on behalf of the 
United States for some PW objective. An example of a covert, indirect action is providing 
financial support to a foreign political party using a private company to channel funds. 
The intended recipient of the funds is unaware that they originated with the U.S. 
government, believing they were from a private company. In this case, the private 
company is the intermediary; with the intended target being the political actor whom the 
U.S. government deems is supporting its PW objective. Unconventional warfare (UW) in 
a limited-war scenario is another example of covert, indirect PW. In limited, 
unconventional war, an outside government covertly supports a foreign underground 
resistance within a target country. In this case, the intermediary is the underground-
resistance force, whose actions target the existing foreign regime.  
4. Overt, Indirect Actions  
The bottom-left quadrant contains political warfare actions that are overt and 
indirect. An example is the DOS influence on a political ally to conduct an action on 
behalf of the U.S. In the Italian case examined in this research, the U.S. government used 
influence with the British to gain their diplomatic support of the Socialist Party of Italian 
Workers (PSLI). This British action helped legitimize the new political party, where 
similar U.S. actions would have hindered the overall objective. The U.S. government 
used the British government as an intermediary to conduct an overt action of political 
warfare on a target country. Unconventional warfare (UW) conducted in a general war 
scenario is another case of an overt, indirect action—for example, U.S. military 
assistance to the Kurdish forces in Iraq against the Islamic State or former Saddam 
regime. The United States is overt in its presence and assistance to the Kurdish forces, 
but indirect in its approach. The U.S. uses Kurdish ground forces as an intermediary, with 
the intended target being the Islamic State or the former Saddam government.  
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The quadrants within the two-dimensional spectrum of political warfare are used 
as the first framework to assess the actions of political war. This framework helps reveal 
patterns to provide insight into the successful combination of political warfare 
approaches. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The analysis tool developed in this research categorizes PW actions along a 
covert-overt axis and a direct-indirect axis. This two-dimensional framework provides 
insights into how the United States conducts political warfare. The next chapter turns to 
social movement theory and models to describe political environments and the group 
mobilization process.  
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III. POLITICAL WARFARE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
THEORY 
The ability to influence collective action or inaction is key in achieving PW 
objectives. Political warfare seeks to effect change or gain influence over the thinking of 
a population to induce a reaction or action to support a political warfare objective. The 
British focused on “winning the war of ideas”27 to achieve action or inaction in WWII. 
Seabury and Codevilla, two political warfare scholars, highlight the “marshaling of 
human support, opposition, or energies”28 as best practices. Blackstock, a political 
warfare theorist, emphasizes “extending control over individual political entities, political 
groups or factions within the state, the nation state itself, or even multinational groups.”29 
It is agreed that influencing the process by which group mobilization or collective action 
occurs is the way to achieve a PW objective. 
The processes involved in explaining collective action are explored through the 
study of social movements. The social movement scholars Charles Tilly and Sidney 
Tarrow define collective action as a group’s “coordinated efforts taken on behalf of a 
shared interest or program.”30 According to Jonathan Christiansen, social movements are 
“organized yet informal social entities that are engaged in extra-institutional conflict that 
is oriented towards a goal. These goals can be aimed at a specific and narrow policy or be 
more broadly aimed at cultural change.”31 Stephen Engel suggests that “social 
movements are inherently and fundamentally a political phenomenon since their target is 
the state.”32 Social movements and PW actors use collective action to achieve their 
                                                 
27 British Political-warfare Executive, The Meaning, Techniques, and Methods of Political-warfare, 
11. 
28 Seabury and Codevilla, War: Ends and Means, 77. 
29 Blackstock, The Strategy of Subversion, 43. 
30 Charles. Tilly and Sidney G. Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Oxford, Oxon, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 216. 
31 Jonathan Christiansen, “Four Stages of Social Movement” (EBSCO Publishing Inc, 2009), 2, 
http://www.ebscohost.com/uploads/imported/thisTopic-dbTopic-1248.pdf. 
32 Stephen M. Engel, The Unfinished Revolution: Social Movement Theory and the Gay and Lesbian 
Movement (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 12. 
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objectives. Their common use of collective action makes the study of social movements 
relevant to the study of political warfare.  
Many of the processes involved in promoting collective action for a social 
movement are the same or similar to the processes a political warfare actor would use to 
influence or induce group collective action or inaction in support of a political warfare 
objective. The last chapter focused on developing a construct to analyze actions based on 
approach and attribution. This chapter investigates the social movement theories that 
explain collective action and identifies tools that can be implemented or modified to 
analyze political warfare. Accordingly, we now focus on the political environments 
where actions take place. Social movement theory models are adapted to identify the 
areas of a political setting where PW actions have an impact.  
To frame a PW setting, it helps to identify its static and dynamic characteristics. 
Static characteristics define a political space, the actors within that space, and their 
relationships. Dynamic characteristics include processes of mobilization and PW actions 
effect. Identifying static and dynamic characteristics in the case studies examined 
uncovers some common themes in U.S. political warfare.  
Tilly’s polity model is useful for mapping the static characteristics of a political 
system and linking the PW framework to a political environment. The contentious 
politics mobilization model is added to accommodate the dynamic processes within a 
political environment and to identify interactions among competing organizations to 
reveal how PW actions affect the mobilization characteristics in the dynamic 
environment. 
A. SIMPLE POLITY MODEL: A STATIC POLITICAL SETTING 
All social movements and group collective action take place within a political 
setting. Tilly’s simple polity model visualization conceptualizes the political boundaries 
within a setting by identifying the limits of governmental jurisdictions and distinguishing 
between groups with direct access to government and those without. Second, the model 
identifies the key players and groups present in the political space, and positions them 
according to their level of government access and jurisdiction. The third function is to 
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identify the relationships between key players within and across the conceptualized 
boundaries. Figure 5 (also presented in Figure 2 on page 8) provides an example of a 
Tilly’s simple polity model.33 
 
Figure 5.  The Tilly Polity Model34  
Tilly uses categories to sort the key players by their position in the political 
setting, which depends on access to government, location in the political setting, and 
level of political organization.  
• Polity members are constituted political actors enjoying routine access to 
government agents and resources.  
• Non-polity members are groups or individuals outside of the polity.  
• Challengers are political actors that lack routine access to the polity.  
• Subjects are persons and groups not currently organized into constituted 
political actors.  
 
                                                 
33 Doug McAdam, Sidney G Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 13. 
34 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention. Modified model adding Subjects arrow. 
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• Outside actors are those groups or individuals, including other governments, 
that are outside the jurisdiction of the government.35  
For the case studies analyzed, the polity model simplifies the complexity of 
political settings. It also identifies the location of the groups or individuals, in the 
political space, the U.S. targets for influence through supportive action and, by adapting 
Tilly’s original model, clarifies the nature of the coalitions by differentiating between 
covert and overt interactions.  
B. “CONTENTIOUS POLITICS”: A DYNAMIC MODEL ADAPTED FOR 
POLITICAL WARFARE 
Unlike McAdam’s political-process model (discussed in detail in Appendix A), 
the CPM model describes the interactive processes between multiple political 
organizations, with each group seeking its political objectives in competition with the 
others. The CPM model captures the interactive processes of collective action for various 
forms of government by describing group interactions that occur inside and outside the 
governmental system.  
The CPM model adapted by this research identifies four general areas an outside 
actor can use to manipulate political interactions within a target country. These 
classifications aid in the analysis of planned PW strategies in the cases. In addition to the 
areas of manipulation, this research identified an area of evolution that can be used to 
assess the effectiveness of a PW strategy. Using the two fields in the adapted mode will 
help a PW actor predict the outcomes of contemplated actions.  
1. Politics and Contention 
McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow define contentious politics as  
episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their 
objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of 
claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect 
                                                 
35 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, 12. 
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the interests of at least one of the claimants. Roughly translated, the 
definition refers to collective political struggle.36 
Politics and social movements have similar and overlapping processes—
the processes that explain social movements can also be applied to 
institutionalized political actions. McAdams et al. state, “the boundaries 
between institutionalized and non-institutionalized politics are hard to 
draw with precision. The two sorts of politics interact incessantly and 
involve similar causal processes.”37 Because the processes of social 
movements (as non-institutionalized politics) and institutionalized politics 
overlap, the authors can apply their expertise in social movement theory to 
institutionalized political processes within an established system of 
government.  
The CPM model also provides a new, dynamic approach to understanding the 
interactions among competing organizations within institutionalized political systems. 
Using the underlying theories of social movement development, the CPM model explains 
the dynamic interaction between two social movement organizations within the same 
political space, uncovering how two political organizations with access to government 
interact—or how a social movement interacts with a competing political establishment. 
The processes of dynamic interaction help explain the emergence, assimilation, and 
decline of a claimant organization confronting an institutionalized or non-
institutionalized opposition group.  
McAdam et al. define two types of political contention: contained and 
transgressive. 
a. Contained Contention  
Contained contention occurs when all parties are previously established actors 
employing well-established means of claim making. It consists of episodic, public, 
collective interactions among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one 
government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to claims, (b) the claims would, 
                                                 
36 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, 5. 
37 Ibid., 7. 
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if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants, and (c) all parties to the 
conflict were previously established as constituted political actors.38 
b. Transgressive Contention  
Transgressive contention consists of episodic, public, collective interaction among 
makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an 
object of claims, or a party to claims, (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests 
of at least one of the claimants, (c) at least some parties to the conflict are newly self-
identified political actors, and/or (d) at least some parties employ innovative collective 
action. Action qualifies as innovative if it incorporates claims, selects objects of claims, 
includes collective self-representation, or adopts means that are either unprecedented or 
forbidden by the regime in question.39 
By accommodating contained and transgressive categories, the CPM framework 
can apply equally to social movements from outside the polity and contentious politics 
from within. The versatility of this model makes it ideal for U.S. political warfare—it 
applies to many types of governments and competing organizations. The CPM model 
helps a PW actor pinpoint the target areas that can be manipulated to achieve an 
objective. The individual components of this model expand McAdam’s political-process 
model into a competitive environment of multiple actors. The political-process model is 
used when looking at the mobilization processes internal to a social movement. The CPM 
model is used when looking at the process that effect group mobilization external to the 
social movement or political actor.   
2. Contentious Politics Mobilization Model 
As illustrated in Figure 6, the CPM model combines two of McAdam’s political-
process models and puts them in competition. The CPM model is a more dynamic 
explanation of collective action than the original political-process model, explaining the 
                                                 
38 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, 7. 
39 Ibid., 8. 
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interactive mechanisms of how organizations grow and decline in the face of 
competition.  
The CPM model also broadens its application beyond the collective action of 
social movements, to institutionalized political action. The background processes of the 
CPM model continue to operate under the same or similar principles outlined in 
McAdam’s political-process model; however, the new construct expands the scope of the 
mobilization process, providing explanation of competitive interaction. The political-
process model can be used to explain the internal processes of social movement 
development. The CPM model is used to explain the external processes of competition 
that affect social movement development. Figure 6, also introduced in Figure 3 on page 
7, is the contentious politics mobilization model depicting the interactive process 
dynamics. 
 
Figure 6.  The Contentious Politics Mobilization Model40 
 
                                                 
40 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention. Modified image adding the Social 
Construct/Framing Process image at center 
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a. Broad Social-Change Processes  
McAdam et al. describe how broad change processes affect both the member and 
challenger. Figure 6 indicates the impact broad change has on the two groups, with 
arrows pointing to the attribution of threat and opportunity fields of both. The processes 
leading to broad change include human migration, the strength of the economy, third-
party economic stimulus, economic sanctions, famine, and population growth. As in the 
political-process model, broad socioeconomic change and change processes of the CPM 
model can increase or decrease political opportunities and threats for both member and 
challenger organizations. Unlike the political-process model, the broad change processes 
of the CPM model do not directly impact organizational strength. In the new model, the 
organizational strength aspect of the political-process model becomes a part of the social-
appropriation field.  
b. Attribution of Opportunities and Threats 
The CPM model modifies the political opportunities and threats of the political-
process model and incorporates the notion of attribution. McAdam et al. postulate that 
opportunities and threats are not objective categories, but depend on a collective 
attribution developed through a social construct that is aided and influenced by the 
collective action frames voiced by various actors, not just social movement leaders.41 For 
an opportunity or threat to be recognized, it must be “visible to potential challengers and 
perceived as an opportunity…. [The] attribution of opportunity or threat [becomes] an 
activating mechanism responsible in part for the mobilization of previously inert 
populations.”42 The attribution of opportunity and threat leads to an increase or decrease 
in the “mobilization potential” described in McAdam’s political-process model.  
c. Social or Organizational Appropriation  
The political-process model focuses on pre-existing mobilizing structures and 
resources indigenous to the social movement as a means of mobilization. By contrast, the 
                                                 
41 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, 43–45. 
42 Ibid., 43. 
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CPM model focuses more on “the active appropriation of sites for mobilization.”43 
Figure 6 indicates the relationship between the attribution of threat and opportunity and 
organizational appropriation, with a single arrow pointing to social or organizational 
appropriation. McAdam et al. modify the political-process model because they believe 
challengers are more likely to possess organizational deficits than resource deficits. 
“Challengers, rather than creating new organizations, appropriate existing ones and turn 
them into vehicles of mobilization. Social appropriation… permits oppressed or resource-
poor populations to sometimes overcome their organizational deficits.”44 Mobilizing 
structures can be preexisting or created in the course of contention, but in either case they 
need to be appropriated by a movement as vehicles for struggle.45 Movements engage 
more in appropriating other social organizations than in building new organizations from 
scratch.  
Group mobilization and recruitment in the CPM model are similar to the 
mobilization and recruitment process outlined in McAdam’s political-process model. The 
only variation is the shift in focus to organizational appropriation and block recruiting 
over individual recruitment and the development of a new social movement. Once the 
mobilization process occurs, groups begin to engage in collective action. The success of 
group collective action depends on the group’s ability to innovate collective action tactics 
and the response from opposition groups. 
d. Innovative Collective Action 
The CPM model expands the political-process model ideas of collective action. 
Tilly and Tarrow claim that collective action, or the process of claim making, is a result 
of the “repertoires of contention” for a given population—that is, what people do when 
they make a claim, which depends on what they know how to do and what society has 
come to expect them to do within a culturally acceptable set of options.46  
                                                 
43 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, 44. 
44 Ibid.s 
45 Ibid., 45. 
46 Sidney G Tarrow, “Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoire 
of Contention,” Social Science History 17, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 283. 
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Contentious repertoires are arrays of contentious performances that are 
currently known and available within some set of political actors. 
Contentious performances are relatively familiar standardized ways in 
which one set of political actors makes collective claims on some other set 
of political actors.47 
Contentious repertoires are groupings of contentious performances.48 Tilly and 
Tarrow observe, “Repertoires vary from place to place, time to time, and pair to pair [or 
challenger to member]. But on the whole, when people make collective claims, they 
innovate within the limits set by the repertoire already established for the place, time, and 
pair.”49 Tilly and Tarrow explain collective action innovation by its interrelationships 
with perceived opportunities and threats, mobilizing structures, and the framing 
processes. 
Repertoires draw on the identities, social ties, and organizational forms 
that constitute everyday social life. From those identities, social ties and 
organizational forms emerge both the collective claims that people make 
and the means they have for making claims. In the course of contending or 
watching others contend, people learn the interactions that can make a 
political difference as well as the locally shared meaning of those 
interactions. The changing interactions of everyday social organization, 
cumulative experience with contention, and regime intervention produces 
incremental alterations in contentious performances.50 
The innovation that occurs within contentious performances attempts to produce a 
desired political effect or outcome. Those contentious performances that are found 
effective become part of a society’s contentious repertoire. The successful performances 
then diffuse across social networks, to be applied by new claimants under new social 
contexts.51 
 
                                                 
47 Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 11. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 16. 
50 Ibid., 23. 
51 Tarrow, “Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoire of 
Contention,” 286. 
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In McAdam et al.’s CPM model, the repertoires of contentious action of both 
member and challenger organizations are put into an interactive field of competition. This 
interaction is indicated by the up and down arrows in Figure 6. The outcomes of the 
interaction can lead to the escalation or diminishment of a shared perceived uncertainty 
for the parties involved in the contentious performance. The process of group reflection is 
indicated by the arrow pointing from innovative collective action to escalation of 
perceived uncertainty in Figure 6. The resulting outcome of the contentious performance 
affects both the challenger’s and the member’s attribution of threat and opportunity. This 
process is indicated in Figure 6 by arrows pointing from the escalation of perceived 
uncertainty to the attribution of opportunity or threats. The cycle from attribution, to 
mobilization, to innovative collective action and interaction, with consequent escalation 
or decline in uncertainty then contributing back to the group attribution of opportunity 
and threat, continuously evolves as contention occurs within a political setting. 
e. Social Construct and Framing 
The political-process model focuses on “cognitive liberation” as a function of a 
group’s framing efforts to identify a problem and present a solution. In the CPM model, 
cognitive liberation is replaced by the concept of the social construct. The social 
construct is interactively framed or influenced by challengers, their opponents, state 
entities, third parties, and the media.52 The media, and other sources of communication, 
inadvertently frame a movement for its participants and for others within a political 
setting. Cultural resources then constrain and shape the deliberate framing efforts of 
movement leaders and opposition groups.53 The social construct is a psychological 
process that affects all other variables identified in the model. The framing process 
determines how different groups within a political setting try to influence the social 
construct to influence the mobilization efforts of both member and challenger 
organizations. For more information on the framing process see Appendix A. 
                                                 
52 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, 45. 
53 Ibid., 44. 
 28 
3. Contentious Politics Mobilization Model: Areas for Third-Party 
Manipulation and Evaluation 
The four areas of manipulation in the CPM model and the area of evaluation are 
identified in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  Contentious Politics Mobilization Model Adapted to 
Political Warfare54 
  
                                                 
54 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention. Modified the model for application to 
political warfare identifying the fields of manipulation and evaluation area. 
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a. Area 1: Broad Change Processes 
The first area for manipulation, illustrated in Figure 8, is the broad social change 
process indicated by oval 1. Broad social change processes affect a target’s environment 
by increasing or decreasing opportunities for challengers and members. Third parties or 
outside actors can manipulate broad social change through economic processes, 
population migration, and trade, to name a few. 
  
Figure 8.  Contentious Politics Manipulation Areas55 
b. Area 2: Attribution of Threat and Opportunity 
The second area designated for manipulation, illustrated in Figure 8, is political 
opportunity and threats, as indicated by oval 2. The political opportunities structure of 
McAdam’s political-process model is directly associated with the attribution of threat and 
opportunity. A third-party PW actor can influence the political elites or movement 
leaders of a target country using bribery, coercion, or other manipulative methods. Third 
parties with influence over key leaders can attempt to shape or manipulate the actions of 
those leaders to create opportunities for groups whose actions align with third-party PW 
objectives. A third-party actor could use his influence over key leaders to generate 
                                                 
55 Ibid. Modified the original model for political warfare by identifying manipulation areas. 
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actions to suppress or oppress efforts of groups making claims that do not align with the 
third-party’s PW objectives.  
c. Area 3: Social Construct 
The third area available for manipulation is the social construct, indicated by the 
oval 3 in Figure 8. Media outlets and organization leaders, under third-party control or 
influence, can manipulate the social construct to reflect a third-party’s narrative. Third 
parties can also directly contribute to the social construct through normal media channels 
and public addresses that target a population within the political setting.  
Media outlets and organization leaders can be manipulated to frame events 
favorable to a third-party PW objective. Populations receptive to the social construct 
frames being used influence the group’s attribution of threat or opportunity. The 
attribution of opportunity increases the mobilization potential of organizations or 
individuals in social or organizational appropriation. An increase in threat attribution 
tends to decrease the mobilization potential of a challenger organization. (For more 
information on mobilization potential see Appendix A.) 
d. Area 4: Organizational or Social Appropriation 
The fourth area outlined for third-party influence is organizational or social 
appropriation, as indicated by oval 4 in Figure 8. Third parties can allocate resources to 
organizations whose actions align with their objective. Third-party support can influence 
a challenger or member’s ability to appropriate organizations or institutions. Resources to 
an organization can be increased or decreased by a third party’s actions. The availability 
of resources (money, weapons, food, manpower, training, etc.) affects an organization’s 
ability to mobilize, recruit, and sustain collective action.  
e. Area 5: Prediction and Evaluation  
This study also uses the CPM model as an evaluation tool to monitor the 
effectiveness of PW efforts. In Figure 9, the area encompassing the field of innovative 
collective action and escalation of perceived uncertainty is indicated by rectangle 5. This 
field becomes the area in which a third-party actor can gauge successes or failures. 
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Monitoring the outcomes and collective effects in the evaluation area enables a third-
party actor to determine the success of a PW action and adjust future strategy in the four 
manipulation zones to achieve the desired effect. The CPM model provides the actor with 
a single model to plan, implement, and evaluate a political warfare strategy for a given 
target country. 
 
Figure 9.   Contentious Politics Evaluation Area56 
C. CONCLUSION 
The adapted CPM model and the polity models are tools a PW actor can use to 
map the environment of a given target country, determine the areas available for 
manipulation, and evaluate the potential effects a strategy may have on a political setting. 
The two models help identify challengers and members, organizations and social groups 
used for mobilization, and the potential political opportunities and threats a PW actor 
might exploit. The modified CPM model identifies the social construct as a key area of 
manipulation, which uses media messaging and alternative frames to support a third-party 
PW objective.  
Using the adapted CPM model with an understanding of the political-process 
model enables a political warfare actor to gauge what collective action repertoires groups 
                                                 
56 Ibid. Modified original model for purposes of political warfare identifying the area of PW 
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will enact during mobilization and predict the possible outcomes or responses of the 
competing parties. By analyzing the interactions that take place during the contentious 
performances of member and challenger organizations, an actor can adjust a PW strategy 
to changing conditions. The modified CPM model becomes the framework from which 
the actor focuses resources, evaluates success and failure, and identifies areas for 
continued manipulation. The following case studies apply these adapted models to 
historical events with the PW-spectrum framework in Chapter II. 
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IV. ITALIAN CASE STUDY: 1943–1948 
The transition from actual war to political war was never more apparent than in 
Italy at the end of WWII. The Allies’ defeat of the Axis powers ushered in a new type of 
war: a political war between two contrasting ideologies, with democracy in the West and 
communism in the East. Italy was to become a stepping-stone for the United States to 
develop and test Cold War strategies for combating communist expansion and influence 
around the world.  
This study analyzes U.S. political warfare through the efforts of the DOS, the 
early CIA, and DOD, beginning with the allied invasion of 1943 and ending with the 
Italian general election of 1948. Italy was chosen as a PW case due to dominant DOD 
involvement in shaping the political atmosphere in the transition from war to peace. 
Efforts conducted by the three agencies are classified according to the direct, indirect, 
covert, or overt spectrum and aligned with the adapted CPM model in the categories of 
broad change processes, social constructs, attribution of opportunities and threats, and 
social or organizational appropriation. Tilly’s modified polity model is used to visualize 
the coalitions of the competing parties by illustrating links across polity lines, 
government jurisdictions, and third-party influencers. The political warfare-adapted 
polity model represents how third parties used overt, covert, direct, and indirect coalitions 
to influence Italian politics. Using the analytical tools developed in Chapters II and III, 
this analysis shows the accomplishments of each agency and identifies the DOD’s 
contribution to PW strategy.  
A. BACKGROUND  
During WWII, the military was used to induce Italian political change. The 
military, acting as an instrument of traditional war, pursued the objectives of Italian 
military surrender and defeat, regime change, and implementation of a democratic form 
of government that would be favorable to allied and American influence. The Allies 
sought to achieve their objective by way of diplomatic, informational, military, and 
economic manipulation. Diplomatically, they sought Italian political and military leaders 
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to negotiate an Italian surrender. In the information domain, the allied strategy was aimed 
at winning the war of ideas, combating fascist ideology and German influence through 
information operations. Militarily, the Allies sought to defeat the Italian armed forces 
through overwhelming force, superior strategy and equipment, and to achieve military 
and political objectives by instigating an Italian popular uprising against fascism and 
German occupation. These objectives were pursued by manipulating the Italian economy 
and the information available to the people, creating civil unrest and disorder that 
weakened Italy’s political establishment and German occupational control. 
Once the Allies had physical control over Italy and the Italian political 
establishment, they implemented a transitional government that was commanded by the 
Allied Control Command and Allied Military Government. As the war ended, allied 
military control over the Italian political space began to slowly devolve to the Italian 
political elite, first at the local level and then at the national. At this point, the Allies had 
reached their main objective of bringing WWII to a close. Now they had to assist in 
developing an effective Italian government that would be favorable to allied influence. 
The Allies, and in particular the Americans, did not realize the need for a change in 
strategy until after the first Italian elections were held in June 1946.  
1. Military “Oversight” in the Transitional Government 
Immediately following the allied landing in Sicily, the Allied Control 
Commission began negotiating with King Victor Emmanuel III, the Italian monarch. The 
King, in an effort to gain favor, orchestrated a coup d’état against Mussolini, resulting in 
the dictator’s arrest. King Victor Emmanuel then proclaimed a new constitutional 
monarchy, consisting of military leaders and civilian technicians led by the newly 
appointed Prime Minister, Marshal Pietro Badoglio.57 On September 3, 1943, the 
Badoglio government signed, under pressure, an armistice calling for the cessation of 
hostilities against allied forces.58 Despite the monarchy’s efforts to establish a new 
government, an anti-fascist underground movement began to form that would later 
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challenge the King’s authority. The political parties that developed from the anti-fascist 
movement later become the focal point of the developing proxy political war between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union. 
The Committee of National Liberation (CLN), an anti-fascist coalition, formed to 
challenge the Badoglio government. The CLN consisted primarily of pre-fascist political 
parties outlawed by the Mussolini dictatorship. The political ideologies of coalition 
groups ranged from Marxist and socialist ideologies in the Italian Communist Party (PCI) 
and Italian Socialist Party (PSI) on the left, to capitalist and democratic ideologies on the 
right. The Christian Democrats (DC) and Italian Liberal Party (PLI) represented the right 
end of the political spectrum, with more centrist ideologies represented in the Action 
Party (AP) and the Democratic Labor Party (PDL). The AP and the PDL represented the 
intellectual community and monarchists, but lacked a popular base of support within the 
population.59 Although the groups’ politics and ideologies were at odds, they set aside 
their differences and formed a united front that focused on the rehabilitation of Italian 
society, post fascism.60  
In spite of Prime Minister Badoglio’s official prohibition of organized political 
activity, the CLN gained political power with support from the masses. The CLN 
effectively inserted itself into government at the local level and began coordinating with 
both the Allied Military Government and the newly formed Badoglio government. In the 
liberated south,  
the CLN became the center of political activity, while in the central and 
northern part of Italy, they reverted to clandestine activities in order to 
organize the resistance movement against the German and neo-fascist 
occupiers.61  
The Allied Control Commission provided the partisans with weapons, supplies, 
and financial support, relying heavily on the CLN to coordinate war efforts in the enemy-
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held territories of Northern Italy.62 The allied reliance on the CLN at the local level in 
liberated areas, and in the ongoing war effort in Northern Italy, helped the CLN gain 
influence with the Allied Military Government. At the insistence of the Allies, the CLN 
was incorporated into the Badoglio government in Rome.  
Initially, the Badoglio government resisted inclusion of the CLN, due to 
incompatible political ideologies. However, the Allied Control Command forced the 
transitional Italian government to accommodate the CLN, with all parties, in a newly 
established cabinet. On June 7, 1944, with the allied liberation of Rome, General 
MacFarlane insisted on Badoglio’s resignation and requested that King Emmanuel 
abdicate his throne in favor of his son, Prince Humbert. These political changes by the 
Allies punished the monarchy for the perceived support given to Mussolini in the past. 
General MacFarlane also removed Badoglio from power because of his ineffectiveness in 
organizing Italian military support against the Germans as a cobelligerent, coupled with 
his ineptitude in preventing Mussolini’s escape.63 Under McFarlane’s direction, the 
leader of the Democratic Labor Party (PDL), Ivanoe Bonomi, was appointed as prime 
minister. The inclusion of the CLN and the abdication of the king effectively established 
the cabinet as the sole representative authority of the people.64  
The 1943 armistice stipulated unconditional surrender of the Italian military and 
authorized a new government to be formed under the supervision of the Allied Control 
Commission and Allied Military Government. The allied military occupation of Italy 
provided the Italian government an initial opportunity to reorganize and restructure itself 
in the aftermath of the Mussolini dictatorship. The shortsightedness of the Allies, and in 
particular the United States, however, prepared conditions for future political conflict. 
The allied government, consisting predominantly of military leaders, ordered and 
appointed Italian officials, and formed a new cabinet with representation from all anti-
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fascist groups, to include communists with known connections to the Soviet Union.65 
The decision by the Allies and U.S. military to include the Communist Party in the new 
Italian government set the stage for the political conflict that became known as the Cold 
War.  
2. Can Democracy Prevail? 
On December 31, 1945, the Allied Control Command and the Allied Military 
Government ceased to operate in Italy. The 1945 appointment of Prime Minister Alcide 
De Gasperi, a Christian Democrat, helped usher in the new Italian government, with 
public general elections scheduled for June 1946. This first general election would decide 
Italy’s fate as a constitutional monarchy or a republic. The United States did not realize 
the extent of the Italian communist and socialist political threat until receiving the 1946 
election results.  
The outcome of the June elections established the Italian government as a 
representative democracy and indicated the level of popular support each political party 
had within the population. The Christian Democrats had the greatest share of the popular 
vote, with 35.2%. The Socialist Party (PSI) came in second with 20.7%, followed by the 
Communist Party (PCI) with 18.9%.66 Surprising the United States, the PSI and the PCI 
received almost 40% of the vote. It became clear that future Italian elections could lead to 
a communist or a socialist government that would threaten U.S. and allied influence in 
Italy (see Appendix B for detailed information on Italian political parties).  
Once the U.S. and allies realized the socialist and communist threat, they began to 
develop new strategies to limit communist expansion in Western spheres of influence. 
These new strategies in Italy became the foundation of future U.S. political warfare 
policies.  
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B. BEGINNING OF U.S. POLITICAL WARFARE  
With the Christian Democratic Party receiving the most seats in the cabinet from 
the 1946 general election, De Gasperi was able to continue his role as prime minister. 
James Miller, of the historical office for the U.S. Department of State, conducted a study 
of U.S. action leading up to the 1948 election in Italy. The resulting article provides a 
detailed account of their effect on the Italian government. Miller describes the De Gasperi 
1946 government as an unstable coalition between the PCI, PSI, and the DC, with 
ideological conflicts creating deadlock on major reconstruction issues that ultimately 
stifled the recovery of the Italian economy.67 Donald Sassoon believes the major reason 
the Italian economy was so slow to recover, despite U.S. economic stimulus, was due to 
the communist and the socialist parties’ control of major positions inside the government. 
PSI and PCI leaders were appointed to the ministries of finance, trade, labor, and 
agriculture.68 As a result of PSI and PCI efforts to impede economic recovery, the Italian 
population began blaming De Gasperi and his inability to govern as prime minister. The 
weak De Gasperi government and poor economic conditions led to increasing strikes and 
incidents of politically motivated violence in mass rallies and demonstrations.  
The organized public unrest was most likely coordinated and instigated by the PSI 
and PCI; because of this subversion, the Christian Democrats were badly defeated in the 
November 1946 local elections in Rome.69 If the Roman elections foreshadowed the 
future political landscape in Italy, the United States would need to increase its efforts to 
thwart a democratically elected communist or socialist government. To do so, it would 
need to identify an alternative party to support and develop strategies that would 
undermine communist and socialist influence.  
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1. The Beginning of Overt Political Warfare 
Walter Dowling, the Italian desk officer at the Department of State, noted the 
increased instability and urged the United States to abandon its hands-off approach in 
Italian internal affairs, recommending increased economic aid and overt political support 
for De Gasperi and his initiatives.70 Heeding Dowling’s warning, President Truman 
began an overt campaign to recognize Italy as a full member of the international 
community and invited De Gasperi to the United States for a ten-day, highly publicized 
conference. During De Gasperi’s January 1947 visit, he conferred with the president and 
other top officials. These high-level engagements enabled the Italian government to 
receive a number of new aid grants and a $100 million Export–Import Bank loan, which 
later proved ineffective due to deadlock in the Italian government.71  
The overt, direct actions of the Department of State increased the attribution of 
opportunity for the DC, further legitimizing the De Gasperi government while also 
increasing the potential threat to PCI and PSI leadership. Grants and loans were directed 
at improving the economy through broad social-change processes linked to reconstruction 
and humanitarian aid. Together, the DOS engagement and economic-aid packages tried 
to alter the social construct by psychologically inducing Italians to favor U.S. backing 
over that of the Soviet Union. The use of overt public engagements and publicized 
economic relief programs illustrate how a third party can manipulate the social construct 
within a target to achieve strategic objectives. 
In an effort to break the Italian deadlock, Secretary of State George C. Marshall 
increased pressure on the De Gasperi government, overtly suggesting that De Gasperi 
conduct radical reforms.72 On May 8, 1947, Marshall approved a memorandum that 
identified the Italian Communist Party (PCI) as a serious threat to American interests in 
the Mediterranean and suggested that a reform-minded, anti-Communist Italian 
government would be answered with the assurance of all possible U.S. aid and support.73  
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On May 12, in response to Marshall’s statement, De Gasperi resigned as prime minister 
and formed a new minority party government consisting of Christian Democrats, 
independent members of the Liberal Party (PLI), the Italian Social Movement Party 
(MSI), and the Monarchist National Party (PNM).74 
On June 2, the United States endorsed the new De Gasperi government and 
offered the Italian government an opportunity to participate in the American-financed 
program of European reconstruction known as the Marshall Plan.75 Marshall’s overt, 
direct statement presented opportunity and threat to the De Gasperi government. The 
attribution of opportunity was the U.S. guarantee of increased economic aid and full 
recognition in the international arena. Marshall’s support was conditioned upon De 
Gasperi’s ability to remove communist elements from the government. The attribution of 
threat was that if De Gasperi didn’t expel the communists, the U.S. would guarantee that 
Italy would not receive Marshall Plan aid. Marshall’s statements, followed by De 
Gasperi’s innovative actions, decreased the political opportunity for the communists and 
socialists as members of the polity. De Gasperi’s move to push the communists out of 
government forced the parties to act as non-polity members. As such, the Communist 
Party was able to act more aggressively in protest actions and threaten revolution, as the 
normal channels for resolving conflict in contained contention were no longer available. 
The PCI and PSI were now forced to engage in transgressive, contentious action.  
Having been excluded, the PCI and PSI responded by implementing tactics for 
mobilizing the masses, including a series of strikes and political-agitation rallies intended 
to create heightened tension and compel the De Gasperi government to resign.76 The 
Communist Party even resorted to threats of armed violence. Palmiro Togliattie, the party 
chief of the PCI, issued a statement at a September 7th Perma rally suggesting that the 
Communist party had a force of 30,000 armed men at its disposal. Togliattie threatened to 
use the militia against the De Gasperi government if the PCI was not reinstated as a full 
                                                 
74 Sassoon, Contemporary Italy, 18–19; Mammarella, Italy after Fascism: A Political History 1943–
1965, 145–149. 
75 Miller, “Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948,” 40. 
76 Mammarella, Italy after Fascism: A Political History 1943–1965, 153. 
 41 
member of the government.77 The PSI and PCI, now acting outside the polity, 
implemented a series of claims that helped mobilize resources for collective action in the 
form of protests and armed violence. By mobilizing its base, the PSI and PCI sought to 
influence the future actions of the new Italian government. The threat of violent 
revolution was used as a bargaining tool in the event the PSI and PCI continued to be 
excluded from politics, despite their being legitimate political parties. 
2. Overt, Covert Political Warfare 
In response to the PCI and PSI threats, the United States began contingency 
planning for a possible Italian civil war and approved efforts to reinforce the De Gasperi 
government’s legitimacy and security apparatus. The National Security Council 
recommended, through NSC 1/1, that the United States provide full support to De 
Gasperi through economic aid, including bread rations, additional credits and loans for 
reconstruction, improving the capabilities of internal security forces, and supporting 
major foreign-policy objectives of the Italian government; the use of armed forces, 
however, was ruled out.78 De Gasperi called upon the United States to delay troop 
withdrawal until the last legally possible date of December 14, 1947.79 The presence of 
U.S. military forces in Italy increased the attribution of threat toward a potential PSI- and 
PCI-organized coup. Even though NSC 1/1 ruled out direct military involvement in Italy, 
President Truman continued with an overt threat, issuing a public statement suggesting 
that the United States will react firmly to any use of force to overthrow the De Gasperi 
government.80 With the U.S. military still present in Italy and American political backing 
of the De Gasperi ministry, President Truman, through the social construct, was able to 
increase the attribution of threat on PSI and PCI members using diplomatic, 
informational, and military means.  
                                                 
77 Miller, “Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948,” 40. 
78 National Security Council, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy,” NSC 1/1 
(Washington, DC: National Security Council, November 14, 1947), 724–726, 
http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-
idx?type=div&did=FRUS.FRUS1948v03.i0015&isize=text. 
79 Miller, “Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948,” 43. 
80 Ibid. 
 42 
To reinforce the president’s statements, Army Chief of Staff Dwight D. 
Eisenhower recommended the CIA prepare a list of potential agents that could be used in 
covert operations within Italy to stifle a PSI and PCI coup.81 The covert preparation by 
the CIA in Italy would eventually evolve into a much larger covert operation in the 
1950s, “Operation Gladio.” Operation Gladio was an underground paramilitary 
organization established as a resistance and guerilla force that could be mobilized in the 
event of Soviet invasion or communist revolution.82 CIA actions were taken in 
preparation for covert, indirect intervention that would increase the attribution of political 
threat on the PCI through acts of sabotage and the mobilization of resources against the 
PCI.  
The U.S. Army also increased the military supply program to the Italian internal 
security forces under De Gasperi’s control. DOD actions improved De Gasperi’s internal 
security-force capabilities against a potentially well-armed communist and socialist 
revolutionary movement. Additionally, the DOD proposed the mobilization of anti-
communist Polish troops in the event of insurrection, as an alternative to U.S. direct 
intervention.83 The efforts of the Army acted upon the fields of attribution of threat and 
opportunity, as well as organizational appropriation, by providing resources for 
mobilization. By increasing the capabilities of the internal security forces controlled by 
the De Gasperi government, they increased the attribution of a potential threat against the 
PCI and militant PSI protesters. Although never enacted, the use of Polish troops would 
be a covert, indirect action by the U.S. military to influence the attribution of threat for 
the PCI and militant PSI revolutionaries. 
To decrease the potential for revolution, the Department of State overtly 
suggested that De Gasperi broaden his government to include the Republican and Social 
Democrats (PSLI). De Gasperi implemented the suggestion in December 1947.84 The 
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inclusion of this party in the new government signaled an increased attribution of 
opportunity for political parties that did not espouse violence or militancy, while also 
decreasing the pretext for a communist coup by drawing away moderate supporters from 
the PSI into the PSLI. De Gasperi’s actions, influenced by DOS suggestion, signaled a 
desire for cooperation and reform. Through the social construct, De Gasperi increased the 
attribution of opportunities within the Italian political space. The Department of State’s 
suggestion was an overt, direct action that targeted the political-opportunity structure of 
the Italian government, with secondary impacts on the social construct and resources in 
social or organizational appropriation within Italy’s political parties.  
“The Vatican shared American apprehensions about a communist coup. With the 
encouragement of U.S. diplomats, the Vatican edged toward full participation in the anti-
communist coalition.”85 The overt, indirect actions of the Department of State influenced 
the Catholic Church to develop a coalition against communism. By bringing the full 
support of the Church behind the DC political party, the Department of State had an 
indirect means to combat communist expansion. With the U.S.–Catholic Church coalition 
in effect, the archbishop of Milan, Cardinal Ildefonso Schuster, officially condemned 
communism, insisting that communism and Catholicism could not coexist in Italy. The 
Pope also ordered Catholic Action (CA) to break any communist-inspired general strikes, 
limiting the strikers’ ability to stifle the Italian economy and decrease their political 
effectiveness.86 Actions by the Department of State to influence the Church as a third 
party decreased the attribution of opportunity for the PCI. Department of State actions 
also affected the social construct by altering mindset of Italian Catholics toward 
communism. The United States was able to organizationally appropriate the Catholic 
Church to support its objectives.  
By December 1947, political tension within Italy began to subside. Italian factions 
began focusing the majority of their efforts on the upcoming spring elections.87 Despite 
U.S. overt intervention and the reorganization of De Gasperi’s government, the 
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possibility of a peaceful communist takeover through the electoral process remained.88 
The PSI and PCI, capitalizing on their success in the general election of 1946, formed a 
single party under the name of the Popular Democratic Front.89 By combining the two 
parties, the Popular Democratic Front had the potential to gain an electoral majority with 
40% of the popular vote. If the 1946 voting statistics were any indication of how the 1948 
election would turn out, 40% of the popular vote for the Popular Democratic Front could 
beat the Christian Democrats, who had received 35% in the last election. The merger of 
PSI and PCI, through organizational appropriation, increased the likelihood the 
communists would gain control. With the increased likelihood of a communist-led Italian 
government in 1948, the United States was forced to consider expanding its available 
options to counter the potential outcome. 
C. EXPANDING POLITICAL WARFARE OPTIONS 
In response to the growing threat of a communist takeover and increased 
possibility of civil war, the Department of Defense sent a Marine regimental combat team 
to reinforce naval forces in the Mediterranean.90 This overt, direct act by the U.S. 
military increased the attribution of threats on the PCI, but also provided the PCI an 
opportunity to exploit this overt U.S. aggressive action by framing U.S. actions in anti-
American, imperialist propaganda. The communist use of anti-American propaganda was 
an effective tool in manipulating the social construct. De Gasperi skillfully staved off the 
propaganda disaster by supporting the U.S. maneuver, insisting that it originated at the 
request of the Italian government. The Department of Defense learned to measure its 
overt acts of intervention against a potential public response.91 The Department of 
Defense would need to explore more indirect methods to gain leverage within Italy’s 
political space.  
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Revisiting the changing Italian situation, the National Security Council concluded 
that a coup was unlikely to occur until after the April elections.92 To strengthen De 
Gasperi’s government, NSC 1/2 proposed increased economic aid, expediting the 
shipment of surplus military equipment to Italy, and a vigorous propaganda campaign to 
show American support for Italy’s future. The council also suggested that the European 
Recovery Program be passed prior to the April elections.93 The Department of State 
implemented NSC 1/2 suggestions by coordinating campaigns of economic aid with press 
releases designed to show the Italians that the United States was deeply concerned with 
their fate. In addition, the Department of State explored ways to encourage private U.S. 
groups and individuals to get involved in the Italian election. One measure was to 
secretly raise funds through U.S. business and organized labor groups to supplement the 
political campaigns of the Christian Democrats (DC) and Social Democrats (PSLI).94 
Part of the reason for the Department of State’s indirect, covert actions was the lack of an 
established legal mechanism to transfer money directly to the DC or Social Democrat 
Party. The Department of State promotion of private contributions was an indirect 
measure that blurred the lines between overt and covert. The funds raised reinforced the 
field of resources for mobilization in organizational or social appropriation. The U.S. 
Department of State actions organizationally appropriated U.S. private business and labor 
unions to support the anti-communist effort in Italy. 
The Vatican, satisfied with the American commitment to a crusade against 
communism, stepped up its own activities. In a public statement on February 22, 1948, 
the Vatican defined the election as a choice between communist atheism and 
Catholicism. The Pope then called on Catholic Action to mobilize the faithful to defeat 
the PCI and ordered the clergy to vote in the elections.95 Vatican actions influenced the 
contentious politics mobilization model in the fields of social construct and resource 
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mobilization, through social and organizational appropriation of the Catholic community 
and organizations.  
The De Gasperi government, with the backing of the United States and the 
Church, expanded its own effort to limit the threat of a communist coup. On February 2, 
the government banned all paramilitary organizations and enforced the ban through the 
police and other internal security-force action, using updated equipment from the 
Department of Defense.96 Having the overt support of the United States and the Catholic 
Church enabled the De Gasperi government to act aggressively against communist 
militancy. Thus, an attribution of opportunity was afforded the De Gasperi government, 
through the overt action of the United States. Department of Defense supply programs 
were meanwhile aimed at increasing the capabilities of Italy’s internal security, which 
enabled De Gasperi to mobilize his resources through organizational appropriation to 
combat communist militancy.  
Although De Gasperi was using his resources to combat the threat, he was losing 
political support within the Italian population. The Department of State’s attempts to 
raise private funds failed to give the DC and Social Democrats enough money to support 
their campaigns. The Popular Democratic Front (PDF) victories in the local elections in 
Pescara confirmed what polls predicted as a sweeping leftist victory in the upcoming 
April national elections.97 More drastic measures were needed to legally support friendly 
political campaigns and more money was needed to organize greater public support for 
the DC and undermine the Popular Democratic Front.  
1. NSC 1/3 Expanding Covert Political Warfare  
On March 8, 1948 the National Security Council approved NSC 1/3, which 
authorized covert funding of the PSLI and the DC by the CIA’s Office of Special 
Projects, initially under the supervision of the secretaries of state and defense. Secretary 
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of Defense Forrestal took charge of covert funding operations.98 These CIA actions to 
fund political campaigns are classified as covert, direct actions that influenced the CPM 
model in the field of resource mobilization and organizational appropriation. Other CIA 
measures authorized by NSC 1/3 were the use of funds to covertly sponsor articles and 
political commentary in the media outlets of Italy and other countries to sway the social 
construct against the Communist Party. The CIA assisted in publishing books, 
periodicals, and brochures to combat communist ideology.99 CIA actions in subsidizing 
articles and political commentary through third-party indigenous media outlets are 
classified as covert, indirect actions affecting the social construct.  
Other measures proposed by NSC 1/3 included U.S. support of returning the Free 
Territory of Trieste to Italy and a private letter campaign from U.S. citizens and 
government officials directed at the Italian citizenry, highlighting the critical nature of the 
coming election.100 Department of State support for returning Trieste was a direct, overt 
action that would change the social construct, broad social-change processes, and the 
attribution of opportunities for a DC-led government. The letter campaign was an overt, 
indirect action that specifically targeted the social construct with secondary effects in 
social appropriation.  
In preparation for an Italian civil war, President Truman authorized the covert 
shipment of arms to Italy to support the anti-communist insurgency network and internal 
security forces.101 The shipment of military arms, much of which was already in the 
country at Department of Defense bases, directly affected the resources used for 
mobilization in organizational appropriation. Since the resources were directly supplied 
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to De Gasperi’s security forces, the action was able to decrease the mobilization potential 
of the PCI and PSI paramilitary organizations by increasing attribution of threat in the 
CPM model threat and opportunity field. The action was also indirect, because some of 
the weapons were intended for the anti-communist insurgent network.  
Truman expanded covert efforts to get U.S. corporations and labor unions with 
major investments in Italy to contribute secretly to the Social Democrats (PSLI). The CIA 
coordinated with Common Cause of New York City, a minority charity group with tax-
exempt status, to channel government funds. Other funds were funneled to the DC by the 
U.S. government through a Swiss bank.102  Channeling funds through third parties is an 
action that is covert and indirect, changing the resources field of mobilization in 
organizational or social appropriation. 
2. Political Warfare: Sprint to the Voting Line 
On March 14, 1948 the Senate passed the European Recovery Program Act, 
followed by a vote in the House of Representatives ten days later. On April 2, 1948, 
President Truman signed the bill at a special ceremony designed to maximize impact on 
the social construct within Italy.103 Passing the European Recovery Program Act, also 
known as the Marshall Plan, was an overt, direct action by the Department of State to 
influence broad social-change processes within Italy. At the time of its passing, it also 
influenced the attribution of opportunity and threat. A Christian Democrat Italian 
government saw the recovery act as an opportunity to improve DC’s influence with the 
Italian people. The Communist Party, which opposed the act, perceived the Marshall Plan 
as a potential threat.  
As the bill was being passed through the House and Senate, the Department of 
State and Marshall issued public statements that stipulated all American aid would be cut 
off in the event of a Communist Party victory in the next election.104 The Department of 
Justice also attempted to influence Italians by applying a “1919 act to refuse immigration 
                                                 




visas to anyone who belonged to the Communist Party and to expel any party members 
living in the United States.”105 The statements of the Department of State and actions of 
the Department of Justice were intended to alter the social construct, which presented an 
opportunity for the DC or the PSLI and a threat for the Peoples Democratic Front (PDF), 
the PCI and PSI coalition.  
The Department of State also transferred twenty-nine merchant ships to the Italian 
government in a special White House ceremony intended to show America’s support for 
Italy’s economic recovery and admiration for the new democracy.106 Before the election, 
American propaganda in Italy intensified. Radio broadcasts and newsreels were 
produced, emphasizing the importance of Marshall Plan aid to Italian recovery. Emphasis 
was given to the fact that no communist nation was participating in the European 
Economic Recovery Program. Voice of America broadcasts to Italy increased, with 
interviews of prominent Italian-Americans and entertainers, who appealed to Italian 
voters to reject communism and highlighted the consequences Italy would face if the 
communists were allowed to gain power.107 Other CIA black and gray propaganda 
efforts were conducted through Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.108  
These Department of State radio statements and public announcement were overt 
and direct, intended to act upon the Italian social construct to favor democracy over 
communism. Using influential public figures and entertainers was overt and indirect, also 
intended to affect the social construct. The CIA propaganda efforts through Radio Free 
Europe and Radio Liberty are classified as covert, direct actions, because both stations 
were entities established and run by U.S.-government organizations. CIA efforts to place 
articles and propaganda in local media were covert, indirect actions, since the CIA was 
using third parties to influence the social construct.  
On March 20, 1948, the United States cemented a coalition with the British and 
French and issued a declaration on the status of the Free Territory of Trieste. The 
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declaration called for the entire region of Trieste to be returned to Italian jurisdiction. The 
coalition actions forced the Soviet Union to publicly announce its position on Trieste, in 
favor of Yugoslavia, a communist ally. The Soviet Union chose to denounce the 
declaration, which indicated to the Italian public that the Soviet Union was unwilling to 
support Italian interests.109 The U.S. action to develop a coalition and issue a statement 
on Trieste was an indirect and overt action affecting broad social-change processes and 
the Italian social construct.  
The Department of State arranged to have the British foreign office publicly invite 
a prominent Social Democratic trade unionist to London for a trade conference on labor 
participation within the European Recovery Program. During the conference, the foreign 
office was able to secure an Italian Labor Party public statement condemning the PSI for 
collaboration with the PCI.110 British actions, under the influence of the Department of 
State, were overt and indirect in influencing the attribution of opportunity for the PSLI 
while also shaping the social construct. The inclusion of the PSLI improved their ability 
to gain resources for mobilization through contracts they acquired from Marshall Plan 
funding. The PSLI’s condemnation of the PSI presented a potential threat toward PSI 
leaders through the manipulation of the social construct. PSLI actions also hindered the 
PSI’s ability to benefit from Marshall Plan contracts, affecting their ability to gain 
resources for mobilization. Finally, at the Department of State’s request, the French and 
British agreed to entertain the Italian application for membership in the newly created 
European Union.111 These American actions were overt and indirect, intended to 
influence broad social-change processes, the social construct, and the attribution of 
opportunity for a democratic Italian government and inclusion in the European Union.  
As a result of U.S., Vatican, and other third-party efforts, the April 18, 1948, 
election outcome was a Popular Front (PCI/PSI) defeat. The coalition received 31.03 
percent of the vote, with the Christian Democrats receiving 48.48 percent.112 The United 
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States touted the Italian Christian Democrat victory as a successful operation against 
communist expansion and used the experience gained as a template for developing Cold 
War strategies.  
D. CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AREAS OF EVALUATION 
In the Italian case there are multiple contentious episodes that could be used to 
evaluate the U.S. PW strategy in contained and transgressive action. In contained 
contention there was the DeGaspari’s resignation as prime minister and his formation of a 
minority party government. DeGaspari’s innovate action was in response to Marshall’s 
statements of full Marshall Plan support if the PCI and PSI were removed from 
government. Other contained contention episodes included the local elections in Pescara 
and the national elections in 1948. The Pescara local election indicated the United States 
was losing ground in the PW effort to support the PDC. The U.S. adjusted its PW 
strategy with NSC 1/3 that expanded covert options in funding the PSLI and the DC as 
wells as expanding the covert efforts to manipulate the social construct. The 1948 
national elections results indicated the PW strategy was effective in limiting PSI and PCI 
influence in government. 
The transgressive episodes of contention included the Italian security forces 
response to the PCI and PSI instigated public protests, riots, and demonstrations. When 
the parties were removed from government, the DOD effort to strengthen the DeGasperi 
security apparatus proved to be effective in limiting the PCI and PSI protester response 
and action. When the PCI indicated they had formed a 30,000 man revolutionary army, 
the DeGasperi government placed a ban on paramilitary organization. The DeGasperi 
government was able to enforce the ban through DOD’s effort to improve the DeGasperi 
security apparatus.  
Although this case analysis is not able to capture every U.S. action aimed at 
influencing the Italian political system, it examines each agency’s actions and influence 
through the adapted CPM model. The next section examines the Italian political 
environment by identifying political parties, support groups, and coalitions. The tables 
following the Italian polity-model illustration in Figure 10 identify the individual efforts 
 52 
of the Department of State, CIA, and Department of Defense. Each agency’s actions are 
categorized in tables that combine the CPM model manipulation fields with types of 
action, whether overt, covert, direct, or indirect.  
 
Figure 10.  Italian Polity Model, 1948113 
E. THE ITALIAN POLITY MODEL OF 1948  
Figure 10 provides a visualization of the complex conditions in Italy’s political 
environment. The polity model shows the support networks and coalitions that formed 
among parties within the government, the organizations that existed outside the 
government, and third-party influencers. The United States was able to build 
relationships in three key areas. The first was U.S. covert and overt coalitions developed 
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with key party officials within the Christian Democrats and the Socialist Party of Italian 
Workers. These coalitions allowed the United States, a third-party actor, to influence the 
Italian government directly, at the source.  
The second key area was U.S. coalitions within the labor unions and other non-
polity members. Coalitions outside the polity primarily supported key American 
coalitions within the polity. The United States supported non-polity member 
organizations that were backed by key leaders inside the polity, which helped reinforce 
the mobilization of important party officials in the coalition. The U.S. allocation of 
resources to the mobilization process of non-polity members enabled key coalition 
leaders within the polity to maintain power in government, increasing U.S. influence 
within the Italian political space. 
The third key area of relationship building was with third-party entities. Unlike 
the Soviet Union, the United States developed coalitions with third party actors like the 
Catholic Church, which became instrumental in the 1948 election of the Christian 
Democrats. The Catholic Church had infrastructure and networks within the political 
space that the United States could leverage for support of the DC candidate. The 
Christian Democrats’ social appropriation of the Catholic Action Support Network and 
infrastructure made the mobilization of Christian Democrats efficient and effective. 
Catholic Action provided valuable resources and voter support in critical elections and 
helped break the PSI- and PCI-orchestrated union strikes of 1947. The Americans’ overt 
and covert relationship with the Catholic Church facilitated mobilization and helped 
substantiate and legitimize the elections.  
The U.S. also used its influence with the United Kingdom to help the PSLI steal a 
key PSI voter base from the Popular Front coalition. The American use of third-party 
entities to influence the political space within Italy was a determining factor in the Soviet 
coalition’s defeat.  
The Italian polity model illustrates important differences between the political 
coalitions of the PSI, PCI, and the DC. The PSI and PCI were unable to generate a broad 
set of coalitions within the polity. By contrast, the Christian Democrats positioned 
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themselves as a central figure within the polity. By generating coalitions with other 
political parties, the Christian Democrats gained influence within the political 
establishment. The American use of the CIA and DOS to divide the PSI into two parties 
helped degrade the Popular Front network and strengthen the DC coalition within the 
polity. The PSLI offshoot of the PSI brought valuable resources from the labor unions 
Italian Labor Union (UIL) and Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) to the 
PSLI and DC coalition. The United States’ use of PW tactics to split the Popular Front 
coalition helped undermine communist support of the Popular Front through 
appropriation of the trade unions. Dividing the PSI set the conditions for the Christian 
Democratic victory in 1948.   
F. AN ANALYSIS OF ACTIONS IN ITALY  
For purposes of analysis, this research tabulates and classifies the actions of the 
DOS, CIA, and DOD into four types: overt and direct; covert and direct; covert and 
indirect; and overt and indirect. The actions are organized according to where they affect 
the CPM model in the fields of broad social-change processes, attribution of political 
opportunity or threat, the social construct, and social/organizational appropriation for 
resources and mobilization. The CPM model represents the dynamic internal political 
environment for the target country. The classifications of PW action and how they 
influence the CPM model provide insights into the development of U.S. political warfare. 
By identifying how the United States uses its agencies and third-party actors to 
manipulate a target’s political environment, and how each agency tends to focus its 
efforts, we can develop future PW strategies and identify areas for increased DOD 
involvement. 
1. The Department of State  
Department of State actions in Italy, categorized in Table 2, reveal that this 
agency is predominantly focused on overt, direct and overt, indirect actions. Overt, direct 
actions tend to affect the fields of broad social-change process, attribution of political 
opportunity or threats, and the social construct. Overt, indirect actions tend to affect the 
fields of attribution of political opportunity or threats, the social construct, and 
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social/organizational appropriation for resources and mobilization. Of the three Political 
Warfare agencies, the Department of State had the greatest effect on Italy’s political 
environment post-WWII, most notably through broad social-change processes and 
attribution of political opportunity and threat. Its one covert, indirect action was the 
Department of State’s prompting of private citizens to generate monetary contributions 
for the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Socialist Party of Italian Workers (PSLI). This 
use of covert, indirect methods occurred prior to any legal mechanisms for government 
funding of a foreign political parity.  
Another area greatly influencing the Italian political environment was the 
Department of State’s use of overt, indirect actions. The Department of State used its 
relationships and influence with the Catholic Church and other nations to generate third-
party actions favoring U.S. strategic interests in Italy. At the time, a formal diplomatic 
relationship with the Holy See was non-existence. However, unofficially, the Vatican 
cooperated overtly, with the Department of State, and covertly, with the CIA. The actions 
of the Catholic Church can therefore be considered influenced by overt and covert actions 
conducted by the DOS and CIA.  




Table 2.   Department of State Actions in Italy 
State Department 
Political Warfare 
Actions in Italy 
 1946–1948 
Broad Social Change 
Processes Attribution of Political Opportunity or Threat Social Construct Social/Organizational Appropriation 
Overt, Direct 
• January 1946 aid grants and 
$100 Million export import 
bank loan 
• Marshall Plan 
• NSC 1/1 Economic Aid 
• NSC 1 / 2 Economic Aid 
• US Support of returning 
Trieste 
• Truman’s invitation to De Gasperi and the DC in Jan 1946 increased the 
attribution of Opportunity for DC supporters, increasing the political 
threat to the PSI and PCI 
• Marshall’s memorandum identifying the PCI as a threat to U.S. interest 
vowing all possible aid and support to a reformed minded anti-
communist Italian government. Opportunity for DC Threat to PCI 
•  Acting on the increased Political Opportunity presented by Marshall’s 
Memorandum De Gasperi resigned and formed new government 
without PSI and PCI representation. De Gasperi and the new 
government were quickly recognized by the U.S. as legitimate which 
then decreased the Political opportunity for PSI and PCI 
• Truman’s Public Statement, U.S. firm reaction to any use of force to 
overthrow De Gasperi Gov.- Threat to PSI PCI 
• Suggested De Gasperi Broaden Government presenting opportunities 
for Republicans and Social Democratic Parties 
• Because of U.S. support and security aid De Gasperi banned all 
Paramilitary organization and increased security enforcement to combat 
the communist threat 
• US Support of Trieste return to Italy territory presented an opportunity 
for DC because the PCI could not get he Soviet Union to support the 
Trieste return 
• Marshall Plan opportunity for DC threat for PCI 
• Jan 1946 diplomatic conference in the U.S. 
legitimized the Italian Government by 
recognizing them as a full member in the 
International Community and an Allie of the US. 
Economic aid was used to show U.S. support to 
Italy and the lack of Soviet support 
• Truman’s Public Statement U.S. firm reaction to 
any use of force to overthrow De Gasperi Gov.  
• Coordinating NSC 1 /2 aid with press releases to 
show U.S. was deeply concerned with Italy’s fait 
• US support of returning Trieste showed the U.S. 
cared about Italy’s future especially when the 
Soviet Union decided not to support Trieste’s 
return to Italian control. 
• State Department Public Statement indicating that 
if the Communist were to gain an Italian Victory 
all Marshall Plan aid would be cut off. 
• Transfer of 29 merchant ships to show U.S. 
support of Italy economic recovery 
• Voice of America Broadcasts and U.S. 
propaganda with prominent Italian Americans 
• Transfer of 29 merchant ships to the Italian 
Government headed by De Gasperi.  
Covert, Indirect 
   • Secretly Encouraged U.S. private organizations 
and citizens to financially supplement the political 
campaign of the DC and PSLI 
Overt, Indirect 
• US forming a coalition with 
France and Britain to return 
Trieste to Italy control 
• US Urged French and British 
to entertain the Italian 
application for membership 
in the European Union. 
• Catholic Church ordered Catholic Action to break communist inspired 
strikes decreasing opportunity for PSI and PCI mobilization  
• US Urged the British to support the PSLI by inviting key PSLI trade 
union and political leaders to a British trade conference. The action by 
the British helped to legitimize the trade unions that support the PSLI 
creating political opportunity for the PSLI  
• Membership in the European union presented an opportunity for a 
democratic Italian government. 
• US suggestions to allow Republican and PSLI 
parties into government allowed De Gasperi to 
affect the social construct signaling a desire for 
cooperation and acceptance 
• The U.S. Catholic Church anti-communist 
coalition allowed the Vatican to publically 
announce that Communism and Catholicism 
cannot coexist in Italy 
• Satisfied with the Support against Communism 
the Vatican increases public statements to defeat 
communism. 
• US letter campaign 
• Use of prominent Italian Americans in Radio and 
Media Campaigns. 
• The U.S. Signal to allow the PSLI into 
government allowed moderate supporters of the 
PSI an alternative party to join decreasing the 
resource base of the PSI 
• US Diplomats urged the Vatican to support an 
anti communist coalition, Vatican ordered clergy 
to vote in the ‘48 elections 
• US letter campaign supported mobilization 
against PCI 
• Inclusion of the PSLI trade unions in the British 




2. Central Intelligence Agency 
As outlined in Table 3, CIA actions remained predictably in the covert spectrum, 
from direct to indirect. CIA actions in Italy predominantly affected the social construct 
and organizational appropriation for resources and mobilization within the CPM model. 
The CIA had its greatest effects on the social construct through grey and black 
propaganda conducted through Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and subsidized articles 
and publications. The CIA’s use of funds for bribes and campaign financing directly 
influenced the resources available within the supported organization. Supported parties 
and persons of influence used these resources to promote voting mobilization and other 
mass-mobilization efforts. The covert, direct actions of the CIA regarding the attribution 
of opportunity and threat were preparations for the stay-behind resistance network later 
known as the Gladio Brigades. It cannot be determined whether either the PCI or the PSI 
knew of the resistance network at the time. Had they known or perceived the potential for 
the emergence of such a group in the event of a communist coup, it would have increased 
their attribution of threat while decreasing the attribution of opportunity for the PCI. 
Other actions conducted by the CIA as to attribution of threat and opportunity included 
influencing the political elite to create opportunities for coalitions that would support the 
DC-led government. The CIA was able to gain influence with moderate leaders within 
the PSI that helped moderate leaders break away and assisted in the formation of a 
moderate PSLI party. CIA efforts to split the PSI created a threat to PSI and PCI 
leadership, causing them to loose valuable mobilization resources while creating 
opportunities for the PSLI to participate in the DC-led government before the 1948 
elections. The PSLI took critical votes away from the PSI and PCI Democratic Front 
coalition and brought them to the PSLI; by splitting the PSI voter base, the CIA increased 
the likelihood that the DC would win a majority of the popular vote. 
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Table 3.   Central Intelligence Agency Actions in Italy 
Central Intelligence 
Agency Political 
Warfare Actions in 
Italy 1946–1948 
Broad Social 




    
Covert-Direct 
 • CIA initial establishment of the Gladio 
Brigade. If the PCI or the PSI knew of the 
potential existence of a resistance that would 
pose as a potential threat to revolutionary 
action by the PCI or PSI. 
• CIA support of the PSLI leaders presented an 
opportunity for the PSLI to be included in the 
De Gasperi Government threatening the PSI by 
splitting its mobilization resources 
• Radio Free Europe Broadcasts into Italy 
denouncing Communism and supporting the 
DC and PSLI 
• Radio Liberty Broadcasts Denouncing 
Communism and Supporting the DC and 
PSLI 
• CIA helped to develop a breakoff 
political party from the PSI creating 
the more moderate PSLI  
• NSC 1/3 direct funding of the PSLI 
and DC members 
Covert-Indirect 
  • NSC 1/3 covert funding of third party 
entities encouraging the placement of 
political commentary and articles in news 
media of other countries to favor U.S. point 
of view over communist ideologies.  
•  NSC 1/3 Assisted in Publishing books, 
periodicals, and brochures to combat 
communist ideology. 
• CIA organized a clandestine resistance 
force in the event of Soviet incursion 
or Communist Coup  
• Truman expanded efforts to get U.S. 
corporations with major investments in 
Italy along with trade unions to 
support and fund the political 
campaign of the PSLI 
• CIA coordinated with Common Cause 
a New York City Charity to channel 
government covert funds to the DC 
through a Swiss bank. 
Overt Indirect 
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3. Department of Defense 
The Department of Defense actions summarized in Table 4 were predominantly 
overt, direct actions with a few covert, direct and covert, indirect actions. The 
Department of Defense tended to influence the CPM model in the fields of attribution of 
threat and opportunities, the social construct, and organizational appropriation for 
resources and mobilization. The DOD’s covert, indirect efforts to organize the anti-
communist Polish forces and the covert allocation of arms to anti-communist 
underground forces influenced the model in the fields of threat and opportunity and 
organizational appropriation for resources and mobilization, with limited effects on 
Italy’s political environment. The Department of Defense was most effective at 
manipulating Italy’s political environment through overt, direct actions that altered the 
attribution of political opportunity and threat before the end of WWII.   
Having established the Allied Military Government and the Allied Control 
Command, the DOD injected itself directly into the Italian political space and steered the 
political environment to its own advantage, ensuring Italy would form a democracy. The 
DOD was an integral player in the drafting of Italy’s constitution and ensured all political 
parties but the fascists were represented in the new government. The DOD knew the 
political environment, the political parties, and their bases of support through its 
connections with the Allied Military Government at the local level. Having been actively 
involved in local government, the Department of Defense was able to force the monarchy 
to accept the CLN, with all its parties, into the cabinet. The DOD also fired prominent 
political figures and substituted Italian politicians of its choosing. With the end of WWII 
and the turnover of Allied Military Government control to Italy’s political establishment, 
the Department of Defense had a great effect on the resources allocated for the DC 
security forces in the area of organizational appropriation. The use of military resources 
to support the DC security apparatus had an indirect affect that affected the attribution of 
threat and opportunity. By reinforcing DC security forces, the Department of Defense 
increased the attribution of threat associated with the PSI–PCI coalition and created 
opportunities for the DC. 
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Table 4.   Department of Defense Actions in Italy 
 
Department of Defense 
Political Warfare 





Attribution of Political Opportunity or Threat Social Construct Social/Organizational Appropriation 
Overt-Direct 
 • US Maintained Military Presence at the request of the De Gasperi 
government to increase the Attribution of Threat on the PCI and PSI 
• DOD sent a U.S. Marine regimental Combat Team to reinforce 
American Naval Forces in the Mediterranean increasing the threat to 
PCI and PSI plans for a coup 
• Military threat to Italian political elite induced a coup to overthrow 
Mussolini in 1943 
• Under the Allied Military Government from 43–45, the U.S. was 
able to decide who would be placed in Italy’s political positions and 
was able to influence the drafting of the Italy constitution 
• Allied Military Government under General McFarlane threatened 
the political elite forcing Prime Minister Badoglio to resign and 
King Emanuel to give up his thrown.  
• Increasing De Gasperi Internal Security Forces Capabilities 
increased the Attribution of threat by the De Gasperi Government 
toward PSI and PCI mobilization 
• US Military invasion of Italy affected 
the Italian Social construct helping 
them to question the actions of the 
Fascist Dictator Mussolini.  
• US Military deployment of the 
Marine Combat team negatively 
affected the social construct within 
Italy due to skillful Communist 
Propaganda and Framing. 1947 
• NSC 1/1 U.S. Army Increased the Military Aid to 
DeGaspari’s Internal Security Forces. 
• NSC 1 / 2 Increased Military and Security force 
Aid to De Gasperi Gov. 
Covert-Direct 
   • Truman’s Covert shipment of military arms to 
DeGaspari’s security forces  
Covert-Indirect 
   • Began Preparations for mobilizing anti-communist 
Polish troops in the event of insurrection. 
• Truman’s Covert shipment of Military Arms to 
anticommunist underground forces within Italy. 
vert-Indirect 
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G. CONCLUSION 
This case study reviewed CIA, Department of State, and Department of Defense 
actions in Italy, classifying them as direct, indirect, covert, or overt, and illustrated how 
individual actions affected the CPM model in the fields of broad social-change processes, 
attribution of opportunities and threats, organizational or social appropriation for 
mobilization of resources, and manipulation of the social construct.  
Department of State PW actions in Italy tended to have the greatest effect on the 
CPM model of Italy as the agency used various overt, direct, and indirect tactics after 
WWII. The CIA tended to be second in effectiveness, covertly influencing the social 
construct and resource-mobilization fields of the CPM model. The Department of 
Defense was most effective in manipulating the field of attribution of threat and 
opportunity through overt, direct action or indirectly through resource allocation in the 
field of organizational appropriation for mobilization. Indirectly, the Department of 
Defense provided the resources necessary for the Christian Democrats to mobilize their 
security apparatus and threaten Popular Front militancy and destabilization. The 
Department of Defense had its greatest impact on the Italian political space before the 
end of WWII in the Allied Military Government. DOD was able to set the conditions for 
a democratically elected constitutional democracy by promoting or demoting key parties 
and individuals in the early post-war government.  
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V. CHILEAN CASE STUDY, 1961–1973  
U.S. political warfare in Chile from 1961–1973 shows the expansion of the CIA’s 
role in PW strategy and the nexus between U.S. corporate and government interests. As 
in the Italian case study, the primary goal in Chile was to stop a growing communist 
foothold in a U.S. sphere of influence. Unlike Italy, where CIA, DOS, and DOD actions 
complemented one another throughout the PW campaign, the Chilean case shows an 
alteration in U.S. strategy with the changes of the U.S. presidents. In 1961–1964, DOS, 
DOD, and CIA political warfare actions cooperated in preventing the Communist Party 
from controlling the government. After 1964, the Department of State decreased its 
involvement, allowing the CIA to take more control of PW actions. This strategy 
imbalance resulted in the Department of Defense’s acting as the key enabler of the 
political warfare objective. This chapter highlights the U.S. strategy as it progressed from 
a complementary whole among the three agencies to a CIA-centered, covert-action 
strategy. U.S. actions are classified according to the covert, overt, direct, and indirect 
spectrum and where PW actions influenced the political space in the CPM model. This 
case study is organized differently than the Italian study due to the change in U.S. 
presidencies over the twelve-year period. 
A. BACKGROUND  
Having established a constitution in 1833, Chile, Latin America’s oldest 
democracy, had a long-standing tradition of supporting peaceful democratic transitions of 
government. Since the 1930’s, Chile had an active socialist and communist movement, 
with the communist party first getting elected to the Chilean Popular Front government in 
1938. The Communist Party of Chile (PCCH), established in 1922, is the oldest and 
largest communist party in Latin America. The PCCH’s close ties with the Soviet Union 
and communist organizations around the world enabled the PCCH to gain valuable 
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support and resources for organizing membership in the rapidly growing working-class 
unions of 1940s Chile.114  
With the end of WWII and the beginning of the Cold War, the United States and 
the Soviet Union intensified their interference in Chilean politics. In 1948, the Chilean 
Radical Party, partially in power because of its Popular Unity Front coalition with the 
Socialist Party and the PCCH, turned against its one-time ally, outlawing the Chilean 
Communist Party with the Law for the Defense of Democracy. The new Radical Party 
government, possibly under U.S. pressure, cited the revolutionary ideology, subversion, 
and militancy of the PCCH as a threat to order and stability.115 The PCCH, now 
outlawed, was forced into clandestine activities and further infiltrated the Chilean 
socialist parties and trade unions. The PCCH’s close ties with the Socialist Party help 
build a strong relationship that would prove useful in future coalition governments.  
The Communist Party would again become legal in 1958, when President Ibanez, 
a second-term independent, enacted reforms to increase the integrity of the electoral 
system. Re-legalized, the PCCH formed an enduring electoral alliance with the Socialist 
Party and presented a single candidate under a new coalition party of the Popular Action 
Front (FRAP). The PCCH, having been outlawed ten years, replaced the Popular Front 
politics of the 1940’s with “worker front” politics, becoming more militant, exclusive, 
and radical in their ideology, especially after the 1959 Cuban revolution.116 The PCCH, 
now legally accepted, began an aggressive campaign to return to politics in the 
presidential election of 1958.  
President Ibenez’s policies of inclusion and voting reform also allowed the new 
Christian Democratic Party (DC) to gain support. President Ibenez reduced the power of 
landowners by improving the secret-ballot system, enforcing stiff fines for fraud, 
lowering the voting age, and eliminating voter-literacy requirements. Ibenez’s actions 
facilitated the growth of political movements among the peasants, expanding political 
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opportunities for the PCCH and the DC.117 The Chilean Christian Democratic Party, 
founded in 1957 by merging three smaller conservative parties, capitalized on the Ibenez 
reforms and gained support from the middle class, women, peasants, and migrants.118 
The Christian Democrats would become an integral party in countering the FRAP 
coalition in future Chilean elections. 
The Chilean presidential election of 1958 surprised the United States in how 
rapidly the PCCH and the Socialist FRAP coalition had gained popular support.119 The 
United States was operating under the assumption that Chileans would vote as in 1952, 
when the Socialist Party, led by Salvador Allende, had only 5.5% of the popular vote. 
During the 1952 election, Ibanez, running as an independent, won a clear popular-vote 
majority of 46.8%. The Liberal Party candidate, Larrain, had 27% of the vote, and the 
Radical Party candidate, Barrios, took the remaining 20%.120 It was assumed that the 
Socialist Party would have similar results in the 1958 election and that the majority of the 
popular vote would go to Jorge Alessandri, an independent and the son of two-time 
Chilean president Arturo Alessandri. 
The 1958 election were very different. Approximately 32,000 votes separated the 
top two candidates. The Socialist party candidate, Salvador Allende, increased his share 
of the popular vote from 5.5% in 1952 to 28.9%, and Alessandri, the Independent Liberal 
Conservative candidate, received only 31.6% of the vote. The Christian Democratic 
candidate, Eduardo Frei, had 20.7%, and the Radical Party candidate had the remaining 
15.6%.121 The close 1958 election led the U.S. to realize that if no external actions were 
taken, the 1964 Chilean presidential election could lead to a communist-run government. 
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With the election of President John Kennedy, the United States started increasing its 
political warfare efforts in Chile.  
B. POLITICAL WARFARE UNDER KENNEDY, 1961–1964  
President John Kennedy enacted a number of overt and covert policies to 
influence the political space of Chile in 1961–1964. Kennedy’s PW strategy provided a 
balanced approach to successfully counter a potential communist leader’s election. 
Kennedy’s PW strategy was not continued by subsequent administrations, however. This 
section analyzes Kennedy’s political warfare strategy using the developed frameworks.  
1. Overt Political Warfare 
President Kennedy implemented a number of overt direct and indirect PW actions 
using the Department of State and the military as key U.S. actors. 
a. Social Construct 
With the Eisenhower administration openly supporting military dictators in Peru, 
Paraguay, and Venezuela, and then-vice-president Richard Nixon praising Cuban 
autocrat Fulgencio Batista as the Cuban equivalent of Abraham Lincoln in 1955, it was 
not surprising that relations between Latin America and the United States had 
deteriorated by the time Kennedy took office in January 1961.122 His inaugural address 
tried to mend the U.S.–Latin American relationship with vows of support for freedom, 
democracy, and the end of poverty. It also sent an implied threat to any government 
contemplating interference in Latin American affairs. 
To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge—to 
convert our good words into good deeds—in a new alliance for progress—
to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of 
poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of 
hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to 
oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every 
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other power know that this hemisphere intends to remain the master of its 
own house.123 
Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress was planned as a driving force to bring the 
Americas together. Kennedy believed that expanding trade, promoting foreign 
investment, increasing military support, and improving the conditions of the lower 
classes would counter the appeal of communism.124 The goal of the Alliance for Progress 
was that no Latin American country fall into communist hands.  
In his first year of taking office, Kennedy organized presidential receptions and 
Latin American conferences to promote the Alliance for Progress and reduce the 
communist furor after the Cuban revolution of 1959.125 On March 13, 1961, Kennedy 
mentioned the Chilean government’s call for sensible arms limitation in an Alliance for 
Progress proposal speech.126 In August 1961, the Alliance for Progress became an 
official charter of the Americas, with all Latin American states and the United States as 
signatories—with Cuba the one exception.127 The United States pledged $20 billion in 
Latin American grant and loan investments over a ten-year period128—an indication of 
administration’s concern for Latin American affairs. 
Kennedy made six public statements concerning the U.S.–Chilean relationship,129 
and his speeches, receptions, and conferences to promote the Alliance for Progress 
contributed overtly to the social construct of Latin American countries in promoting U.S. 
ties. Unlike the Marshall Plan in Italy, no presidential or Department of State addresses 
focused on a particular Latin American country. In the Marshall Plan, the Department of 
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State stipulated that all U.S. aid would stop if a communist government were elected to a 
potential recipient country. In the Alliance for Progress, the Department of State made no 
similar distinctions; there were plans to support even those governments facing 
communist revolution, which left the democratic election of Communist Party leaders 
open for interpretation. Unlike the Marshall Plan, the Alliance for Progress was framed as 
a humanitarian, social-reform program, rather than an economic stimulus and 
infrastructure-development program. This social-reform framework made it more 
difficult to put conditions on funding. 
Much of Kennedy’s initial success in Latin American public policy was 
overshadowed by the 1961 Bay of Pigs and 1962 Cuban Missile crises. Despite spending 
over a billion dollars in the first year alone, the Alliance for Progress and United States 
credibility as a disinterested actor in Latin America was undermined. “From the view 
point of the Latin American nationalist, the Alliance was never able to overcome its 
identification with Yankee Imperialism.”130 By 1970, not a single Latin American nation 
had committed itself to the comprehensive internal reforms and development programs 
originally intended by the alliance.131 
b. Direct Broad Social Change  
Soon after the Alliance for Progress’s signing, the United States increased its 
foreign aid programs to Chile. “Of all the countries in the hemisphere, Chile was 
unofficially chosen to become the showcase for the new Alliance for Progress.”132 Chile 
received more aid per capita than any other Latin American country.133 “Kennedy 
wanted to show the world the capitalist model of third-world development worked better 
than the Marxist one.”134   
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Between 1961–1963, the Kennedy administration approved around $420 million 
in U.S. economic aid to Chile. Compared to the $301 million in U.S. economic aid in the 
eight years from 1953 to 1960, Chile received almost three times as much per year as it 
had before Kennedy’s election.135 U.S. economic aid was intended to create broad social-
change processes to align Chilean interests with those of the United States and weaken 
communist influence in the government and population. Alliance for Progress aid was not 
limited to economic stimulus and social reform; it was also used to gain greater influence 
over the Chilean military and security institutions.  
c. Organization Appropriation with Opportunities and Threats  
In 1962–1964, the Alliance for Progress and the administration drastically 
increased military aid to Chile. The Chilean military received an average of $19.06 
million per year, totaling over $57.2 million. Compared to the earlier nine-year average 
of $4.64 million, this three-year period brought a four-fold increase in military aid.136 
Coincidently, much of the increase came in 1963, when there was an imminent threat that 
the PCCH would win the 1964 presidency.  
In 1950–1969, the United States trained over 4,500 personnel in the Chilean 
military.137 Most U.S. foreign military training from 1961 to 1969 was focused on anti-
communist conditioning, counterinsurgency, and guerilla warfare.138 The increase in 
DOD aid, coupled with the conditioning, may have been a major contributing factor in 
the Chilean military’s break from its apolitical tradition, to become more boisterous and 
politically active in elections.  
The DOD’s use of training and military aid influenced the Chilean military’s 
social construct. By conditioning Chile’s military to be anti-communist, the United States 
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accomplished two goals. First, the anti-communist sentiment within Chile’s military 
helped create an indirect threat to communist elements within the government. Second, it 
aided in organizationally appropriating Chile’s military to promote U.S. interests. The 
United States thus gained a valuable ally within the government, one that could be used 
to create future political opportunities and threaten those who did not align with shared 
American–Chilean military interests. To further support the U.S. appropriation of Chile’s 
military, the DOD provided resources for group mobilization with increased military 
funds, equipment sales, and leadership training. 
2. Kennedy Administration Covert Political Warfare 
In early 1961, the CIA started laying the groundwork for the 1964 presidential 
election. They first established operational relationships with key leaders in the political 
parties. They then started to formulate propaganda and the organizational mechanisms to 
influence key sectors of the population.139 Many covert mechanisms had been in place 
since the 1950s, when the CIA developed relationships among peasants, slum dwellers, 
organized labor, student unions, and the media.140  
a. Organizational Appropriation 
By March 1962, the U.S. Chilean ambassador, Charles Cole, along with special 
assistant to the president Richard Goodwin, proposed expanding covert action to counter 
the Communist Party in the 1964 presidential election.141 Two proposals were provided 
to the 5412 Special Group that began in 1954 as a planning and coordination body 
responsible for all U.S. covert programs.142 The first proposal requested support for the 
Christian Democratic Party, while the other recommended support for the Radical Party 
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in the Democratic Front coalition.143 Two non-attributable initial payments were 
authorized for the Christian Democrats, one in April 1962 for $180,000 and another in 
August 1963. The Democratic Front (DF) coalition of the Radical Party received 
authorization for a one-time payment in December 1963 to supplement a $500,000 
campaign-expenses gap.144 
 Through 1963, the U.S. could not decide which party or candidate to support in 
the 1964 presidential election: Julio Duran from the Radical Party in the Democratic 
Front coalition or Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei.145 Part of the indecision was due to 
Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963. Once Lyndon Johnson assumed the 
presidency, there was a brief pause in the oversight of covert planning and action, as 
those involved continued Kennedy’s initial Chilean strategy. The Johnson administration 
was less committed to social reforms and the Alliance for Progress than was Kennedy 
and less concerned about Chilean politics, choosing to leave the decision making to the 
CIA and National Security Council.146  In March 1964, the Democratic Front coalition 
was defeated in a pre-election and soon fell apart—a defeat that helped the U.S. Special 
Group decide which party to back. With the Democratic Front coalition no longer a 
viable contender for the presidency, U.S. agencies put their full support behind the 
Christian Democrats. The CIA continued to subsidize the Radical Party candidate, but 
only to support the Christian Democrat effort. By the 1964 election, the CIA had paid 
almost half of PDC campaign costs.147 
In addition to supporting political parties, the CIA also covertly supported private-
citizen groups, slum dwellers, peasants, Masons, trade unions, the Roman Catholic 
Church, U.S. private organizations, student youth groups and dissident socialists.148 
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These groups were used to organize voter registration, place posters, and pass out leaflets 
to support the Christian Democrats or break up the Socialist and Communist coalition 
(FRAP) and bring voters to candidates other than Allende.149 The covert, indirect funding 
of private groups supplemented the U.S. covert effort given to the Christian Democrats 
and none FRAP parties. U.S. covert efforts to socially appropriate groups outside of the 
polity helped mobilize voters for normal collective action process in contained 
contention. The citizen groups were also used to distribute propaganda to influence the 
social construct.  
CIA direct and indirect funding of the Christian Democrats and the direct funding 
of the Radical Party had two impacts on the organizational-appropriation field and the 
political opportunity structure in the attribution opportunity and threat field of the CPM 
model. The first was made by providing resources with which groups could mobilize 
their support bases outside the polity, using media campaigns or buying voters so 
constituents would engage in collective action voting in contained contention on voting 
day. The indirect, non-attributable funding of the PDC supported the defeat of the FRAP 
coalition, but didn’t afford the United States much influence over DC party leaders. Once 
covert, direct funding of the PDC was authorized in April 1964, the United States was 
better able to influence PDC leadership actions.  
The second objective of funding was to facilitate a coalition between the Christian 
Democrats and the Radical Party or break up the FRAP coalition through political 
opportunities or bribery. By providing direct, covert funding to the Radical Party, the 
United States gained influence over Radical Party leaders. This influence could be used 
to create future coalitions and present political opportunities or threats. The CIA also 
supported the Radical Party as a way to change the social construct by “enhancing the 
Christian Democrats’ image as a moderate progressive party being attacked from the 
right and the left.”150 
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Multinational corporations with financial interests in Chile also offered to provide 
covert funding to defeat Allende. In May 1964, the Special Group turned down an offer 
of $500,000 by American businessmen to assist in the covert funding of the anti-Allende 
campaign.151 Instead, the Special Group put the businessmen in contact with the 
embassy, which directed them to overt funding alternatives. The 1964 connection 
between private business and the CIA would play a larger role in future Chilean 
elections.  
b. The Social Construct 
While support was given to political parties, the CIA and the United States 
Information Agency (USIA), under the Department of State, engaged in a massive direct 
and indirect anti-communist propaganda campaign. The CIA and USIA used the press, 
radio, films, pamphlets, posters, leaflets, direct mailings, paper streamers, and wall 
paintings to influence Chile’s social construct.152 The CIA also employed covert, direct 
methods of disinformation and black propaganda in some of its influence messaging.153  
The CIA tended to focus on radio and news media, whereas the USIA produced leaflets, 
posters, films, and direct mailings.154 Both agencies concealed their involvement. 
The U.S. Senate Church report, that evaluated U.S. covert involvement in Chilean 
politics from 1964–1973, describes the CIA and USIA propaganda campaign as 
“enormous.” In the final week of June 1964, two months before the election, both 
agencies intensified their activities. The CIA funded twenty radio spots per day on 
Santiago and 44 provincial stations. Twelve-minute news broadcasts were funded five 
times a day on three Santiago radio stations and on 24 provincial radio outlets. Thousands 
of cartoons and paid press advertising were printed in newspapers and magazines with 
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3,000 posters distributed daily. In the television media, the group produced 24 daily 
newscasts in Santiago, and the provinces, 26 weekly commentary programs.155 
The Church report also calls attention to the CIA and USIA’s efforts in 1964 to 
leverage international support. The Roman Catholic Church generated an anti-communist 
pastoral letter from Pope Pius XI, with hundreds of thousands of copies printed to 
distribute in support of the Christian Democrat campaign.156 Articles against communism 
from abroad were replayed in Chile’s new media. Newspapers reported endorsements of 
Eduardo Frei by the sister of a Latin American leader, a public letter from a former 
president in exile, and a message from the women of Venezuela. Various Latin America 
military government leaders also shared dire warnings about an Allende victory.157 To 
affect Chile’s social construct, almost all of these covert propaganda measures were 
conducted indirectly. The CIA and USIA generated most of the propaganda content, but 
used intermediaries to disseminate the information to hide or obfuscate U.S. involvement. 
The propaganda in the 1964 election used framing to identify the problem of a 
communist government in Chile, provided a solution in a Christian Democratic-led 
government, and issued a call to voter action. 
c. Political Opportunity and Threat 
The CIA took measures within the political opportunity structure of the CPM 
model field of opportunities and threats. In a memorandum prepared for the special group 
entitled “Support for the Chilean Presidential Elections of 4 September 1964,” the CIA 
outlined four of eight objectives aimed at influencing the political opportunity structure. 
1. Bring pressure to bear on the Radical Party to prevent it from formally 
endorsing Allende, or, failing in this, to remain neutral or to run its own 
candidate if it appears that he will not damage Frei. In the event the 
Radical Party declares for Allende, financial assistance will have to be 
provided to individual Radical leaders or groups capable of bringing 
Radical voters into the Frei camp. 
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2. To influence the Conservative and Liberal parties to support Frei in a 
manner that will not damage his image as a reform candidate. To achieve 
this it will be necessary to provide financial assistance to the Liberal and 
Conservative parties or those of their leaders who will work to swing their 
votes behind Frei. 
3. Provide a substantial subsidy [less than 1 line of source text not 
declassified] for the purpose of strengthening his electoral machine and 
campaign capabilities. Efforts will also be made to influence Frei to reach 
a private agreement with the Radicals for their support in exchange for 
some patronage. 
4. Bring pressure to bear on Jorge Prat, partly through Conservative and 
Liberal leaders, to induce his withdrawal from the presidential contest.158 
The CIA’s main effort in manipulating the political opportunity structure was 
through financial means—using bribes or threats to cut off funding to political leaders. 
The CIA used funds and influence over party leaders to create political opportunities for 
the Christian Democrats in developing coalitions with other parties. Other measures used 
financial means to break up the FRAP coalition or buy PDC votes within the congress in 
the event of a close election. These CIA payments to gain influence over key leaders are 
an example of a direct, covert action.  
3. Contentious Politics Evaluation Area 
All these overt and covert, direct and indirect efforts culminated in a single 
contained, contentious event: the September 1964 presidential election. The election 
fielded three candidates—Eduardo Frei from the Christian Democrats, Salvador Allende 
from the FRAP coalition, and Julio Duran from the Radical Party. The election resulted 
in Frei’s receiving 56 percent of the vote, Allende, 39 percent, and Duran, nine percent. 
Applying the CPM model to the dynamic interaction involved, the election results led the 
losing parties to increase their level of uncertainty, making them more susceptible to 
future opportunities or threats in the new PDC-led government. With a clear majority 
going to the PDC candidate, the area of evaluation shows that the U.S. political warfare 
strategy achieved its objective. The threat of a communist-led government in Chile was 
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forestalled. The U.S. had now to prepare for future contentious episodes under the 
Johnson administration. 
C. POLITICAL WARFARE IN CHILE UNDER JOHNSON, 1964–1969 
Although President Johnson assumed office in November 1963, he did not really 
begin to be active in Chilean politics or political warfare until after Chile’s 1964 election, 
having let the CIA and the National Security Council make political decisions on 
Chile.159 During Johnson’s term in office, two minor operations were aimed at actively 
manipulating Chile’s political space, none of which came close to the effort Kennedy had 
put forward. 
1. Overt Political Warfare 
There were few overt actions under Johnson; the administration’s Chilean policy 
followed what the Kennedy administration had established, although with less intensity 
and concern. 
a. Social Construct 
The day following Chile’s 1964 presidential election, Johnson held a news 
conference in which he congratulated the new president, Eduardo Frei, stating “he looks 
forward to cooperating with the newly selected leader…. to work for the economic and 
social development of his country within a democratic framework which emphasis 
personal liberty.”160 Johnson reinforced the notion that the election results were a product 
of “an internal matter in which people of Chile were the only judges of the issues. The 
election reminds us once more… of the strength of democracy in Chile and throughout 
the Western Hemisphere…. reinforcing our hopes for a very bright future in the 
Americas.”161 By publicly endorsing Eduardo Frei, Johnson was influencing the social 
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construct of Chile’s populace. Johnson’s statement reinforcing democratic frameworks 
and personal liberty spoke directly to the communists in Chile. 
Johnson’s September press conference also recognized the Alliance for Progress 
as a contributing factor in advancing democracy and social and economic 
development.162 His endorsement of the alliance indicated that the administration would 
continue its commitment to Latin America and reinforced the social construct trying to 
gain U.S. favor over communism. In an October 2014 public statement, Johnson 
indicated that communism was on the run in Chile and Brazil.163 Johnson’s statements 
continue to remind Chileans of U.S. concern. 
In January 1965, President Johnson’s level of commitment toward Latin America 
was revealed as he indicated he would not provide additional development lending for the 
Alliance for Progress.164 By disapproving funding in favor of increased funding for 
Vietnam, the President signaled a decrease in concern about Latin American affairs. 
Although Alliance for Progress aid continued, Johnson addressed few concerns regarding 
Chile and the Alliance for Progress in his public speeches.  
President Johnson made two public statements concerning the Chilean people: a 
note of sympathy after a disastrous flood in 1965 and a welcome of Eduardo Frei to the 
White House.165 In comparison with Kennedy’s public statements from 1961 to 1963, 
Johnson seemed but little concerned with Chile. 
b. Broad Social Change 
The Alliance for Progress initiative in Latin America continued throughout the 
Johnson administration. Despite Johnson’s focus on Vietnam and hands-off approach to 
Latin America, 1965–1969 brought over $680.6 million in U.S. economic aid to Chile—
                                                 
162 Ibid. 
163 Lyndon Johnson, “Remarks in Springfield, Ill, at the Sangamon County Courthouse,” The 
American Presidency Project, October 7, 1964, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26571&st=Chile&st1=. 
164 Lyndon Johnson, “Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid.” (The American Presidency 
Project, January 14, 1965), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26885&st=Chile&st1=. 
165 American Presidency Project, Presidential Public Statements (key word search “Chile”) 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php 
 78 
around $65 million more per year in economic aid than the $420 million under 
Kennedy.166 The Johnson administration failed to communicate with and exploit the 
Alliance for Progress program in Chile. Little effort was given to overtly affect Chile’s 
social construct using public statements specifically directed to the population. The 
Kennedy administration was vocal about its commitment to Chile. Under the Marshall 
Plan, President Truman’s administration made many overt efforts to address the Italian 
population. One of the failures of the Alliance for Progress may be that not enough effort 
was given to communicate America’s commitment to Chile. 
Between 1962 and 1969, Chile received more than $1.2 billion in aid, loans, and 
grants.167 Much of the aid given through the Alliance for Progress was aimed at creating 
broad social-change processes through the redistribution of wealth, using economic 
stimulus and government reform to combat communist influences in the underprivileged 
classes of Latin America. This strategy, however, did not bear fruit. Despite the Alliance 
for Progress’s lofty goals “only two percent of economic growth in 1960s Latin America 
directly benefited the poor.”168 A large percentage of Alliance for Progress money for 
investment found its way back to the United States, ultimately benefiting American 
business.169 
c. Organizational Appropriation 
Under the Johnson administration, Department of Defense aid continued, but 
decreased sharply after Chile’s 1964 election. Over a four-year period, Department of 
Defense aid went from a $19.2 million average under Kennedy to a $10.9 million average 
under Johnson. The Department of Defense continued training about a hundred military 
service members from Chile per year, increasing the numbers trained in 1968 and 1969. 
As in the Kennedy administration, the United States used military aid and training to 
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influence Chile’s military leaders to favor U.S. interests and reject communism. The 
overt, direct military funding continued the strong relationship between the Department 
of Defense and the Chilean military.  
2. Covert Political Warfare 
After the election of 1964, the scope of covert activities in Chile went back to a 
steady state. Between 1965 and 1969, the CIA spent around $2 million on covert action, 
primarily anti-communism propaganda and on two minor political efforts—a 
congressional election in 1965 and a slightly larger effort in the congressional elections 
of 1969.170 
a. The Social Construct 
From 1965–1969, almost half of $2 million spent on covert action was aimed at 
influencing Chile’s social construct. The CIA funded a rightwing weekly newspaper that 
regularly attacked Allende, the PCCH, and communism. The CIA continued to persuade 
the Chilean wire services to place editorial and news stories that supported the PDC, 
condemned communism, and hid damaging stories about the United States.. Other efforts 
supported anti-communist propaganda through wall posters, leaflet campaigns, and 
public heckling.171 The CIA produced radio political-commentary shows attacking 
political parties on the left and supporting CIA-selected candidates.172 Much of the CIA’s 
effort to shape the social construct focused on anti-communism or anti-Allende 
messaging, leaving a gap in frame messaging. The propaganda identified the problem as 
communism and Allende, but failed to identify a solution. None of the mass propaganda 
efforts supported a particular party or candidate leading up the presidential election of 
1970.  
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b. Opportunity and Threat 
To support President Frei and oppose communist influence in Chile, the CIA 
influenced two congressional elections to strengthen the Christian Democratic party and 
weaken the PCCH. In February 1965, the 303 Committee (the successor of the 5412 
Special Group) approved $175,000 for a short-term political-action project that provided 
covert support to selected candidates in the March 1965 congressional elections in Chile. 
The CIA and the ambassador selected twenty-two candidates to support with covert 
funds. Nine candidates were actually elected. The CIA claimed the operation helped 
defeat around thirteen FRAP candidates they believed would have otherwise won 
congressional seats. In 1967, the CIA spent $30,000 to strengthen a rightwing element of 
the Radical Party.173 
A second effort was authorized in July 1968, to prepare for the congressional 
election of March 1969. This covert project authorized $350,000 to strengthen the 
moderate political parties in the congress in advance of the 1970 presidential election. 
The money supported PDC, non-Marxist radicals, and National Party candidates, along 
with a splinter party from Allende’s FRAP coalition.174 The CIA also tried to influence 
key Socialist Party (PS) leaders in the FRAP coalition to bring them to a European style 
of socialism, rather than a communist form.175 The CIA provided the socialist party 
splinter group with almost half its campaign budget.176 CIA funds targeted the leadership 
of the political parties to create political opportunities for the PDC in future elections and 
decrease the Communist Party influence in government.  
c. Social or Organizational Appropriation 
From 1965–1969, many CIA efforts to appropriate Chile’s organizational or 
social groups for mobilization in future elections were unsuccessful. The CIA attempted 
to organize the urban poor of Santiago to compete with Marxist groups, but terminated its 
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support in 1969 because the group’s leader was unwilling to deliver large-scale votes in 
the 1969 congressional and 1970 presidential elections. CIA efforts to organize anti-
communist slum dwellers, peasants, and social groups were terminated after CIA funding 
was exposed in 1967.177 
The Church Report describes four organizational projects that worked during this 
period. One funded an anti-communist women’s group active in Chilean politics and 
intellectual life; another funded organized labor groups. One project organized a 
democratic labor union to combat the communist-dominated Central Unica De 
Trabajadores Chilenos (CUTCh) and the other supported a Catholic labor field.178 The 
fourth effort funded a protest march against the Soviet Embassy after the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia.179 Through funding, the CIA was able to socially or organizationally 
appropriate Chilean social groups for mobilization in elections. The public exposure of 
CIA efforts to organize voters against the PCCH influenced the social construct, 
undermining the legitimacy of the PDC and other moderate and rightwing parties. 
3. Contentious Politics Evaluation Area 
From 1965–1969, the United States influenced three mobilization efforts that 
could have been used for evaluation of the PW effort. Two of these focused on the 
congressional elections of 1965 and 1969. The third was an organized protest against the 
Soviet Embassy. The protest demonstrated how the Chilean governmental security 
apparatus would react to political mobilization in transgressive contention. The protest 
led to a major police action and mass media coverage.180  
The results from the two elections provided an indication of how well U.S. 
political warfare efforts were achieving the objective in contained contention. The 1965 
congressional election strengthened PDC support within the chamber of deputies and 
senate. In the chamber of deputies, the PDC gained fifty-nine seats, and nine seats were 
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added in the Senate. The communist and socialist parties were the only other political 
parties to gain seats in the chamber of deputies. In the senate, the Communist Party was 
the only party to gain seats with the PDC.181 Much of the PDC’s success in the 1965 
election resulted from the propaganda and organization efforts of the 1964 presidential 
campaign. This political environment was to change. 
In 1969, congressional election results seemed to indicate the socialist and 
communist parties were gaining support in the population. The PDC still remained 
dominant; however they lost twenty-six seats in the chamber of deputies, ceding twenty-
four to the National Party and another eight to the communist and socialist parties. 
Within the Senate, the PDC and the Communist Party (PCCH) were the only two parties 
to gain seats. The PDC gained ten and the PCCH gained two.182 The CIA supported only 
twelve candidates in the 1969 election, with only ten elected. Considering the PDC’s 
major loss in the chamber, the U.S. political warfare efforts leading up to 1969 were not 
enough to prevent the communists from gaining power in the 1970 presidential election. 
D. POLITICAL WARFARE UNDER THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, 
1969–1973  
The Nixon administration approached political warfare in Chile with 
apprehension at first, which grew in the latter half of 1970 into a political warfare panic. 
Under the Nixon administration, the CIA increased its PW relationship with private 
corporations, and the administration circumvented the conventional coordination between 
the Department of State and the CIA by directing some CIA actions without Department 
of State knowledge. 
1. Overt Political Warfare 
The Nixon administration disengaged from Latin America when first taking 
office. The new 40 Committee (the successor of the 303 Committee) was reluctant to 
approve any Chilean PW programs prior to the 1970 presidential election. No clear 
direction was given as to how to proceed in Chilean affairs, and Nixon gave few public 
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statements on Chile and the Latin American people. The administration ended the 
Alliance for Progress, focusing on promoting trade rather than aid. After Chile’s 1970 
election of Allende, the Nixon administration became more vocal about Chilean affairs.  
a. Social Construct  
On October 31, 1969, the Nixon Administration announced the end of the 
Alliance for Progress at an annual meeting of the Inter American Press Association. 
During the meeting, Nixon called for the end to foreign aid and a return to economic 
trade. He termed the new program “action for progress,” implying the United States 
would take a more programmatic approach to Latin American affairs and assist those 
governments that took action for reform and development, rather than give aid in hopes 
of inducing change.183  Nixon’s remarks were cautious toward Latin America and lacked 
the inspiration and hope of the Kennedy administration. This pragmatic view of Latin 
America and Chile might have been a factor in Allende’s presidential victory of 1970. 
The Nixon administration did not mention Chilean affairs again until after 
Allende took office. On January 4, 1971, Nixon mentioned Chile in an interview with 
television networks. During the interview, President Nixon was asked if he felt 
responsible for Chile’s democracy falling to communism. Nixon responded:  
What happened in Chile is not something that we welcomed… although 
we were very careful to point out the… decision was of the people of 
Chile…we accept that decision and…we still recognize the government… 
as far as what happened in Chile… we can only say that for the United 
States to have intervened… in a free election and to have turned it around, 
I think, would have had repercussions all over Latin America...far worse 
than what has happened in Chile.184 
The President would again answer questions about Chile in an April 16 interview 
in which Cuban and Chilean–American relations were discussed.  
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Chile has what is termed a Communist leaning government, at least. We 
will call it a Marxist government. Allende is a Marxist, with strong 
Communist support. As far as Chile is concerned, we don’t particularly 
approve of that type of government. We wouldn’t want it here. On the 
other hand, the Chilean people voted for it. So, as far as our attitude 
toward Chile is concerned, it will be affected by what Chile’s attitude is 
toward us. 
If the Chilean Government does some things internally, that is their 
business and the business of the Chilean people. They voted the 
government in, and they will have to live with it. If, however, they do 
things in Chile or outside of Chile in their foreign policy that is 
detrimental to us, then that is our business, and we will react accordingly. 
We are waiting to see what they will do. As long as they treat us properly 
we will treat them properly.185 
Both interviews indicated the United States had an overt, hands-off approach to 
Chile. Chilean affairs, as far as the public was concerned, were for the people of Chile to 
decide. The president did not speak of Chile again until after the military coup that 
overthrew the Allende government. 
b. Broad Social Change 
With the end of the Alliance for Progress, economic aid decreased sharply from 
1969 to 1973. In 1969, economic aid was at $80.8 million. In 1970, economic aid 
decreased to $29.6 million. Another sharp decrease occurred in 1971, to $8.6 million, and 
again in 1973 to a low of $3.8 million.186 From 1962–1969, the Chilean economy had 
become reliant on over $100 million dollars a year in economic stimulus. By decreasing 
economic aid to Chile in a short time, Nixon was overtly acting to impede the Chilean 
economy, affecting broad social-change processes to encourage conditions for change in 
the political-opportunity structure of Chile.  
The Department of State and other U.S. agencies used their influence within the 
Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and other international financial 
institutions to limit the amount of credit and loans given to the Chilean government under 
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Allende. Without financial backing and government credit, Allende was not able to 
sustain the basic governmental services usually provided to the population. To gain more 
revenue, the Allende government increased taxes on the major private industries in Chile. 
Allende then nationalized the copper and steel industries to use their revenues to cover 
government spending. In appropriating the private industry, Allende set off a chain 
reaction that would lead to the economic collapse of Chile and a military coup in 1973. 
c. Organizational appropriation 
In 1970, the Nixon administration shocked the Chilean military establishment by 
decreasing U.S. military aid from $11.8 million in 1969 to $800,000 in 1970. After 
Allende’s election, the United States increased military aid and training to maintain 
influence over the Chilean military. In 1971, military aid increased to $5.7 million, 
followed by increases in 1972 and 1973 to $12.3 and $15 million, respectively.187 The 
Department of Defense also increased the number of Chilean military students trained in 
Panama. Beginning in 1970, the number of trained almost doubled, to around two 
hundred a year, and continued to increase through 1974.188 The Kennedy and Johnson 
administration’s use of the DOD to overtly organizationally-appropriate Chile’s military 
through military aid and training helped set the conditions for the coup of 1973. 
2. Covert Political Warfare 
The Nixon administration conducted a number of covert operations between 
1970–1973 and spent approximately $7 million to support Allende-opposition groups. 
The administration tried three primary efforts. One was a “spoiling operation” to 
influence the 1970 presidential election. The operation attempted to undermine 
communist efforts to bring about a coalition among leftwing parties in congress, with 
other effort to strengthening non-Marxist political parties and leaders.189 After the 
election of Allende, the CIA constructed two covert campaigns. Track I was an attempt to 
manipulate the presidential-confirmation vote, with Track II exploring options for a 
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military coup. To support both operations, the CIA increased its relationship with private 
business to help set the conditions for political change. 
a. Social Construct 
Many of the same efforts developed to disseminate and generate propaganda in 
1964 were used again during the 1970 election. Hundreds of thousands of high quality 
picture books, posters, and leaflets were printed. Radio propaganda, editorials, political 
features, and news articles were produced for print and radio using three different news 
services. Newsletters were mailed to two thousand journalists, academics, politicians, and 
opinion makers. All the propaganda was focused on a scare campaign against 
communism. Black propaganda was also used to sow dissent among the communist and 
socialist parties and splinter the communist and socialist labor union CUTCh190 
One difference between the propaganda produced for the 1970 election and that of 
the 1964 election was that the 1970 propaganda pointed out the problem with 
communism, but nothing was produced that identified a solution in electing a particular 
party. The 40 Committee decided not to support any one political party during the 
election so the propaganda couldn’t be framed like the propaganda used in the 1964 
election, which pointed to the PDC as the party solution to communism. After Allende 
was elected, almost all of the media and propaganda assets the CIA had developed from 
1964 to 1970 left the country. They had become so visible and vocal against Allende 
during the campaign; they feared he would take action against them.  
With most of the CIA indirect-propaganda machine gone, the CIA became limited 
in its ability to affect the social construct and had to redevelop its propaganda machine. 
CIA agent journalists from ten countries were flown to Chile to provide on-the-scene 
reporting. After the election, the CIA generated a propaganda campaign to influence the 
upcoming congressional vote that would decide the close election. The propaganda focus 
was to create concern for Chile’s future, and it was specifically designed to influence 
Frei, the elite, and the military.191  
                                                 
190 Church and Tower, “Covert Action in Chile,” 22. 
191 Ibid., 24. 
 87 
To implement the campaign leading up to the congressional vote, the CIA used its 
only remaining major propaganda outlet, El Mercurio, a major Santiago newspaper. El 
Mercurio couldn’t do the propaganda job the CIA needed, so the CIA used its assets in 
other Latin American countries to generate foreign news stories about Chile’s situation. 
The CIA also developed its own resources by funding an underground press, financing 
small newspapers, radio programs, political advertisements, rallies, and the direct mailing 
of foreign news articles to Frei, his wife, selected leaders, and the Chilean domestic 
press.192  The CIA propaganda campaign failed to influence Frei or the outcome of the 
congressional vote. Allende was confirmed as president on November 1, 1970.  
The propaganda campaign continued throughout the Allende presidency. From 
1970–1973, the CIA spent $1.5 to keep El Mercurio in business and producing anti-
Allende propaganda. In 1971, the CIA helped the PDC and PN purchase its own radio 
stations and newspapers with CIA money.193 The addition of these party-run assets 
helped the CIA rebuild its propaganda machine during Allende’s presidency. The CIA 
also funded an anti-government news pamphlet directed at the armed services and used 
the pamphlet to pass black propaganda or fabricated information that would prompt a 
military coup. Other black-propaganda efforts included passing Chile’s military and 
police officials fabricated documents indicating an Allende connection with Cuba, and 
plans to arrest or kill senior military officials. In covertly targeting the military, the CIA 
manipulated their social construct to induce a coup.  
The primary propaganda focus during the Allende years was to polarize Chile’s 
population, create the conditions for a military coup, and ensure freedom of the press. 
The same propaganda methods were used during the Allende presidency as in previous 
propaganda campaigns, with more focus on involving the international media. The CIA 
also funded opposition-research organizations that drafted many legal bills in Chile’s 
congress. According to CIA documents, CIA propaganda from 1970–1973 played a 
significant role in setting the stage for the military coup of September 11, 1973.194 
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b. Organizational or Social Appropriation 
Unlike the 1964 election, the 1970 election did not have CIA-funded public 
opinion polls, grassroots organizing, voter registration, and community development. 
Little effort was made to support organizational appropriation for the mobilization of 
voters. The CIA’s one effort was the funding of the Radical Party campaign, so that 
radical party leaders would shore up its left-leaning members to reduce potential voters 
for Allende. 
Without CIA funding of any particular political party in 1970, private business 
tried to assist. Harold Geneen, of the International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation 
(ITT), approached the CIA with a proposal to make private funds available in the 
campaigns of Alessandri and the National Party. The CIA declined to channel the funds 
directly, but did provide them a point of contact in Alessandri’s campaign.195 CIA 
assistance to private businesses in Chile set the stage for future collaboration. 
After the election, the CIA attempted the organizational appropriation of the 
Chilean military in Track II of the anti-Allende campaign. In October 1970, the CIA 
developed twenty-one contacts with key military and carabinero (police) officials to 
inquire into a potential military coup against Allende before the congressional plurality 
vote and swearing in of the new president in November. Those military and police 
officials who were inclined to stage a coup were given the assurance of strong support at 
the highest levels of the U.S. government, both before and after.196 It was determined that 
for the coup to be implemented, General Rene Schneider would have to be removed as 
commander-in-chief of the Army. The CIA assisted in funding a kidnap attempt, using a 
DOD contact to pass weapons and money to indicated U.S. support. The kidnap attempt 
turned sour, resulting in General Schneider’s death. Having failed to generate a military 
coup prior to the presidential confirmation, the CIA ended its Track II effort. The new 
“official” CIA focus was on intelligence collection into potential coupe plots.197  
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Before the successful coup of September 11, 1973, the CIA increased it 
relationships with private business and began passing money to assist in group 
mobilization for transgressive contention in the form of public demonstrations and union 
strikes, and contained contention in voter registration and get-out-the vote campaigns. In 
September 1972, the 40 Committee authorized $24,000 of emergency support for a 
powerful business organization. In October, another $100,000 was authorized to support 
three private-sector organizations in Chile.198 After the March 1973 congressional 
election failed to achieve a two-thirds senatorial majority for the impeachment of 
Allende, the 40 Committee explored increasing its assistance to the private sector for 
protests and strikes.  
In August 1973, the 40 Committee approved a proposal to grant $1 million to 
opposition parties and private-sector groups. CIA documents indicate that none of these 
funds were passed to private organizations before the coup. However, shortly after the 
coup $84,000 was expended for commitments made before the military coup.199 During 
the three-month tucker strike before the military coup on September 11, the CIA passed 
an undetermined amount of money to assist the strikers. The sums never exceeded the 
$25,000 threshold that required 40 Committee approvals.200  
c. Opportunity and Threat 
Following the 1970 election of Salvador Allende with 36.2% of the popular vote 
and Jorge Alessandri with 35.27% of the popular vote, the CIA began a Track I covert 
operation to manipulate the congressional plurality vote that would decide who would 
become president. Under Chilean law, in a close presidential election, in which there is 
no clear majority, congress decides who will be president. The political action portion of 
Track I was an attempt to bribe or manipulate key congressional officials to sway the 
confirmation vote. The CIA came up with an elaborate scheme that would vote in Jorge 
Alessandri were he would resign, resulting in a second election where Eduardo Frei could 
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legally run for a second term. The political action of Track I never materialized, as Frei 
was reluctant to go along with it and the CIA was unable to get support in the congress.  
To support a military coup in the Track II anti-Allende campaign, the CIA had to 
create political opportunity. To do so, the CIA funded a kidnapping operation of General 
Schneider just before the congressional vote to confirm the new president. General 
Schneider, the commander-in-chief, was staunchly opposed to military obstruction of 
political affairs. The kidnapping attempt went south and General Schneider was 
assassinated. With Schneider gone, the mobilization potential for a military coup 
increased. However, the coup would not happen in the time frame the CIA was 
expecting, and the Track II operation was closed down in November 1970. The CIA still 
maintained a covert intelligence-collection relationship with coup conspirators, but did 
not officially influence future coup attempts.201  
From 1970–1973, more than half of the 40 Committee’s $7 million in approved 
funds supported the main opposition political parties: the Christian Democratic Party 
(PDC), the National Party (PN), and several socialist splinter groups from the Popular 
Unity (UP) coalition, in an attempt to forge a united opposition to the Popular Unity 
government.202 CIA funds supported the opposition parties in three elections, municipal 
elections in 1971 and 1972, and the congressional election in March 1973. This money 
enabled the opposition parties to maintain an anti-government campaign throughout the 
Allende years and encouraged citizens to demonstrate their opposition views in a variety 
of ways, from voting to street protests, riots, and labor strikes.203   
Other CIA efforts supported rightwing paramilitary groups, notably Patria y 
Libertad (Fatherland and Liberty) and the Rolando Matus Brigade. During the Track II 
period, $38,500 was passed to the groups, by a third party, to help create tensions for a 
military coup. The groups received more funds through the Allende years to assist 
propaganda and demonstration efforts. Patria y Libertad claimed responsibility for an 
                                                 
201 Church and Tower, “Covert Action in Chile,” 26. 
202 Ibid., 28. 
203 Ibid., 29. 
 91 
abortive coup on June 29, and on July 17, the group claimed they would soon unleash a 
total armed offensive to overthrow the government.204 The group’s activities took 
advantage of opportunities that existed and presented threats of a paramilitary offensive 
to overthrow the government.  
d. Broad Social Change 
Operation FUBELT began as adjunct to the Track I and Track II operations of 
1970, but continued until the 1973 military coup. The FUBELT operation was the 
Department of State and the CIA’s deliberate effort to destabilize Chile’s economy, 
which would create broad social change that would affect the political-opportunities 
structure in government, providing opportunities for opposition groups such as the 
military to challenge the Allende government. The CIA used its relationships with private 
businesses and international corporations to limit the short-term credit offered to Chile’s 
government and influenced privately owned U.S. parts suppliers to delay the shipment of 
repair parts for the transportation, copper, steel, electricity, and petroleum sectors.205 
Through covert action with private industry and the overt action of the Department of 
State, the broad social-change process brought about the military coup of September 11, 
1973. 
3. Contentious Politics Evaluation Area 
There were many opportunities during the Nixon administration to evaluate PW 
efforts both in contained and transgressive contention. In contained contention, there was 
the congressional election of 1969, the September 1970 presidential election, the October 
1970 congressional plurality vote, the 1971 and 1972 municipal elections, and the 1973 
congressional election. In transgressive contention, there was the failed coup attempt in 
1970, CIA supported protests and labor strikes, the aborted paramilitary coup in June 
1973, and the successful military coup on September 11, 1973. 
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In preparing for the Allende presidency the Nixon administration adapted its PW 
effort to enact broad social change through economic and financial manipulation, using 
overt and covert measures. The administration continued covert efforts to alter Chile’s 
social construct by calling for the end to the Allende government, pointing out the 
failures of Marxism, encouraging a military coup, and promoting a new military 
government. It also influenced the political opportunity structure by providing direct and 
indirect financial support of opposition political parties and used social appropriation 
though covert, direct and indirect financial support to private organizations. The Nixon 
administration continued to socially appropriate the Chilean military through overt 
military aid and training and covert contacts within the security organization to inspire a 
coup.  
In the 1973 congressional election, the Nixon administration covertly supported 
the Allende opposition parties to gain enough seats in the senate to call for Allende’s 
impeachment. The administration also covertly supported protests and a three-month 
truckers’ strike that would lead to a military coup. Using PW, the Nixon administration 
eventually achieved its objective by overthrowing the Allende government and replacing 
it with a military government the United States could influence. Figures 11, 12, and 13 
model relationships within the Chilean polity in 1964, 1970, and 1973, respectively. The 
next section uses the polity model to analyze U.S. political warfare in the presidential 
elections of 1964 and 1970 and the congressional election of 1973.  
E. CHILEAN POLITY MODELS: AN ANALYSIS 
The Chilean polity models illustrate a complex environment of changing 
alliances, party splits, and evolving support networks. The models also show how the 
U.S. government changed its PW strategy from 1961–1973, revealing covert and overt 
support that changed with each election or contentious episode. This section analyzes the 
models to identify significant changes between the major episodes.   
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1. 1964  
The 1964 Chilean polity model in Figure 11 illustrates the Kennedy 
administration’s successful approach to political warfare in the Chilean 1964 presidential 
election. Three key areas in the 1964 polity model of covert, overt, direct, and indirect 
methods merit discussion. The first area is the direct, covert support given by the CIA to 
party leaders within the polity. In providing direct support to these leaders, the United 
States gained influence over their actions, which directly affected governmental 
decisions. In 1964, the Radical Party had three different ideological groups in its ranks—
some supporting the communists, some the moderates, and some the socialists. To bring 
the party closer to the Christian Democrats (PDC), the United States directly supported 
selected party leaders to strengthen support for the PDC over the Socialist Party or 
Communist Party. The same tactic was done with the Liberal Party and the Conservative 
Party. 
The second area of note is the indirect, covert and overt relationship with non-
polity members in the Catholic Church and women and mothers’ clubs. Providing both 
covert and overt support to the Catholic Church helped the PDC organize its base of 
support and mobilize voters for election day. Providing support to the women and 
mother’s clubs attracted the female vote to the PDC. In Chile, women were very vocal on 
political issues, organizing protests and demonstrations against policies they opposed. 
Through U.S. influence and propaganda, women’s organizations became important allies 
in voter mobilization and influencing the social construct.  
The final area of focus in the model is American overt, direct support of the 
Chilean military. In 1964, Chile’s military was an apolitical organization. Through U.S. 
influence, members became indoctrinated into supporting Chile’s constitution over 
political organizations. However, during the Cold War, the United States used its 
influence in the military to create hatred for Marxist ideology. The United States also 
indoctrinated the military, through training, to fear a communist revolution. Through 
overt training, equipment, and financial support, the United States gained a key polity 
ally that could be mobilized to support U.S. interests if political manipulation failed. 
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Figure 11.  Model of Chilean Polity, 1964206  
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2. 1970 
The Chilean polity model in 1970 Figure 12 illustrates the Johnson and Nixon 
administrations’ unsuccessful approaches to political warfare. The three areas of note in 
this model are the changes in the relationships among political actors, the lack of U.S. 
direct support to key political parties in the polity, and the introduction of private 
business into U.S. covert political warfare. 
From 1964–1970, the political actors had changed. New political parties were 
introduced from the fracturing of the Socialist Party and some parties disappeared after 
merging into a moderate party. The Socialist Party (PS) fractured into three separate 
factions: the PS, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), and the Socialist Democratic Party 
(PSD). The 1964 Liberal Party (PL) and Conservative Party (PCT) consolidated into a 
new National Party (PN) and the Democratic Party was absorbed into the National 
Democratic Party or leftwing groups within the Radical Party (PR). With this splintering 
and consolidation, U.S. political warfare actors should have been aware that the Christian 
Democrats were losing support and the National Party was rising as a potential ally. 
Nevertheless, the 40 Committee chose to focus on propaganda, giving only direct, covert 
support to the Radical Party to prevent it from splitting.  
Indirectly, the United States continued to support the women’s clubs for 
propaganda dissemination, not for organizing voter support behind a single candidate. 
International businesses recognized the National Party as the only group with a chance of 
preventing Allende from being elected. The 40 Committee chose not to take 
businessmen’s offers of financial support, but instead directed them to individuals who 
could pass the funds. By sending businessmen to a figure in the National Party, the 40 
Committee indirectly used a third party to achieve a political warfare objective.  
After the election revealed an Allende victory, the United States attempted direct, 
covert methods. Track I lobbied important political figures within the polity, but not 
having given political parties direct support during the campaign, the United States was 
not well received. Track II was the United States’ activation of its insurance policy in the 
Chilean military. The Track II operation contributed to the unplanned assassination of a 
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leader in the Chilean military, however, and action triggered feelings of national 
solidarity, putting an end to the U.S. Track II covert effort.  
 
 
Figure 12.  Model of Chilean Polity, 1970207 
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3. 1973 
The 1973 polity model in Figure 13 reflects Nixon’s approach to political warfare. 
The administration manipulated the 1973 congressional election to gain a political 
majority for impeaching Allende. The model reveals international businesses as an 
integral player in U.S. political warfare. It also highlights the development of new 
political parties on the left and the right, each taking voter support away from the two 
conglomerates.  
Leading up to the election, the United States directly and indirectly funded all the 
parties and their support organizations to gain a congressional majority in the new 
Democratic Federation. To accomplish this maneuver, the United States splintered the 
Radical Party into three factions by providing direct, covert support to key leaders. The 
original Radical Party went with the Popular Unity coalition, while the Radical 
Democrats and the Radical Left chose the Democratic Federation, supported by the 
United States. The Popular Unity party also fractured supporters from the Christian 
Democrats (PDC) and the National Democrats (DN). Popular Unity created three new 
parties: the Christian Left (IC), the Unity Action Movement (MAPU), and the 
Independent Popular Action (API). The Popular Unity coalition maintained its majority 
in the 1973 congressional election, leaving the United States to rely on Chile’s military as 
the backup means of political warfare. 
To prepare for a military coup, the United States strengthened its relationship with 
the military covertly and overtly. Covertly, the CIA and the DOD maintained 
relationships with military leaders willing to act. Overtly, the United States increased 
military aid and training, providing the resources and leadership training necessary to 
implement a coup and run a government. Additionally, the CIA strengthened its 
relationships in private business by providing covert funds to assist the trucker’s strike.  
Used as a tool to examine political warfare, the polity models help define a 
political setting and identify key players by their access to government. Once the key 
players are plotted, the polity model becomes a targeting and evaluation tool to develop 
and analyze PW strategies. 
 98 
 
Figure 13.  Model of Chilean Polity, 1973208 
  
                                                 
208 Ibid. Modified the Tilly polity model for political warfare distinguishing the type of coalition as 
overt/covert, covert, and overt. 
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F. ANALYSIS OF AGENCY TABLES  
1. Department of State 
The Department of State data in Table 5 shows the social construct and broad 
social-change processes as the two main areas in which Department of State PW actions 
influenced the political dynamic in Chile. It also reveals that the Department of State 
tended to conduct overt, direct and indirect actions with a few covert, direct actions under 
the Kennedy and Nixon administrations. Analysis of the table reveals that most 
Department of State actions took place under Kennedy and declined under Johnson, with 
the exception of Alliance for Progress economic aid started by Kennedy. The Nixon 
administration chose not to overtly address Chilean politics. Nixon’s covert/overt, 
indirect approach to broad social change was the opposite of Kennedy overt, direct 
approach. It could be argued that Nixon’s approach to broad social change processes had 
a greater effect at creating social change than Kennedy’s approach.  
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Table 5.   Department of State Actions in Chile, 1961–1973 
Department of State 
Political Warfare 
Actions in Chile 
1961–1973 




• Alliance for progress foreign aid $420 
million from 1961–64 
• $680 million from 65–69 
• Economic aid decreased sharply in 
1970 $29 mil 
• 1971 economic aid to $8.6 mil 
• 1973 economic aid to $3.8 mil 
 • Kennedy Inaugural Address January 61 
Alliance for Progress 
• March 13 1961 White House announces 
Alliance for progress prospects 
• Kennedy Presidential Receptions for Latin 
American diplomats 
• August ‘61 Alliance for Progress official 
charter 
• Johnson indorses Frei presidency and praise  
• Not increasing Alliance for Progress funds 
• Nixon announces end of the Alliance for 
Progress 
• Nixon’s new program Action for Progress 




  • USIA printed poster, leaflets, magazines, 
books and conducted mail campaigns using 
third parities to distribute 
• Nixon would use influence in international 
financial institutions to limit Chiles ability to 
pay its bills or get funding to run the country 
 
Overt-Indirect 
  • Pope letter to Chile  
• Nixon administration influences Inter- 
American Development bank, World Bank, 
and other international financial institutions to 
limit Chile loans 
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2. Central Intelligence Agency 
The CIA Table 6 shows direct and indirect covert action affecting all the 
manipulation fields in Chile’s political environment. Comparing the three tables, the CIA 
played a dominant political warfare role, focusing most of its efforts on the social 
construct with secondary efforts in the political-opportunity structure and social or 
organizational appropriation. The CIA also conducted broad social-change actions to 
create environmental instability assisted by Department of State cuts in economic aid and 
decreased DOD military aid. Analysis reveals that CIA actions peaked in 1964 and 1973 
and declined between 1964 and 1969. During the Johnson administration, there were 
many opportunities to prepare for the 1970 presidential election against Allende. The 
Johnson and early Nixon administration’s lack of effort in Chilean political warfare 
caused Nixon to be reactive to Chilean political events. Both administrations’ lack of PW 
planning and action caused the Nixon administration to implement drastic and impulsive 
political warfare measures without fully considering the long-term consequences. The 
aggressive reactionary covert PW strategies of the Nixon administration led to the over 
exposure of U.S. involvement in undermining the democratic institutions of foreign 
countries and the connection between oppressive military governments supported by the 
United States. 
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Table 6.   CIA Actions in Chile, 1961–1973 
Central Intelligence 
Agency Political 
Warfare Actions in 
Chile 1961–1973 
Broad Social Change 
Processes Attribution of Political Opportunity or Threat Social Construct 
Social/Organizational Appropriation 
 
Overt Direct     
Covert-Direct 
 • 1963 Funding of the Radical Party Democratic 
Front coalition 
• Infiltrated the PCCH & PS, tried to split PS 
• Funding of DC 
• Influence Radical party leaders to not indorse 
Allende 
• Influence key PS leaders in FRAP coalition  
• $30,000 spent on right wing Radical party 67 
• Track I manipulate the congressional vote for 
Allende presidency confirmation 
• Fund conservative and liberals to support Frei 
• Track II military coup 
• Black propaganda to break FRAP in 
1964 and 1969 
• Black propaganda used in to break PS 
and PCCH coalition 
• Black propaganda used for Chile 
security services and military showing 
Allende connection with Cuba and 
intent to jail military and security 
leaders 
• Black propaganda used to splinter 
communist labor unions 
• Funding Christian Democrats  
• Track II military coup  
• Funding of paramilitary 
organizations Fatherland of Liberty 
& Rolando Matus Brigade 
Covert-Indirect 
• CIA influence in 
international business 
caused a complete shut 
down of essential repair 
parts in all sectors of 
Chile’s economy. 
• Used influence in 
international business to 
limit short term credit to 
Chile government and 
utilities 
• 1962 funding of the Christian Democrats 
• Funding private groups to break up FRAP 
• Moderate party funding in $175,000 in 1965 and 
$350,000 in 1969 electoral races  
• 1970-73 $7mil spent on opposition groups in 
Chile 
• Assassination of General Schneider 
• Funded propaganda against 
communism, films, direct mail poster, 
leaflets, radio, news media 
• Replayed article from abroad, Pope 
letter disseminated 
• @$2 mil in Ant-communist prop 65–
69 
• Use influence with Latin American 
countries to call the dangers if Allende 
is president  
• CIA calls upon covert international 
media Assets to cover Chile’s story 
after loosing most of the propaganda 
assets after Allende election 
•  
• 1962 Funding of the Christian 
Democrats 
• 1964 supplementing half of Frei 
campaign 
• 1964 funded private citizen groups, 
voter registration, and descendent 
socialist 
• Funding community orgs stopped in 
67 because CIA funding was 
exposed 
• Women’s group funding 
• Funded Organized Democratic 
labor unions 
• Passed money to private business to 
mobilize labor strikes and protest 
• Funded the trucker strike 
Overt Indirect     
 
 103 
3. Department of Defense 
Department of Defense actions in Chile Table 7 focused on three manipulation 
fields: the attribution of threat and opportunity, the social construct, and organizational 
appropriation. DOD actions were overt, direct and covert, indirect. The overt, direct 
actions influenced the fields of opportunity and threat, the social construct, and 
organizational appropriation. Covert, indirect actions affected the opportunity and threat 
fields with organizational appropriation. The political warfare effort in Chile would not 
have been achieved without a long-standing DOD overt effort to socially appropriate 
Chile’s military leaders.   
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Table 7.   Department of Defense Actions in Chile, 1961–1973 
Department of 
Defense Political 
Warfare Actions in 
Chile 1961–1973 
Broad Social 




 • Nixon administration decreases military aid 
from $11 million in ‘69 to $800,000 in ‘70 to 
try and induce a Chilean military coupe of 
Allende 
• DOD training conditioned the Chilean 
military to be heavily anti communist 
• DOD military aid $57.2 million 61–64 
• DOD foreign military training in 
Panama. Training over 4500 Chilean 
military from 1950 thru 1969 
• $54 million military aid training 400 
personnel 64–69 
• Mil aid decreased to $800,000 in 1970 
• Military training would increase to 200 
per year from 1973–1975 
Covert-Direct 
    
Covert-Indirect 
 • Track II the CIA would use DOD to identify 
key Chile military leaders that would be 
willing to conduct a coup 
• DOD would use provide assurance the U.S. 
would support a coup action 
• DOD threatened to cut off Aid if Allende was 
elected 
 • . Track II DOD used military aid as a 
means to appropriate the Chilean 
military for a coup 
 
Overt Indirect 




G. CONCLUSION  
The Chile case is an interesting PW study because it illustrates changing PW 
strategies with each U.S. president. It also shows the successes and failures of U.S. 
political warfare strategy over a twelve-year period. Comparing the agency tables with 
the changing polity models reveals the PW strategy as it changes with each president. 
Over the three presidencies each agency was used in a slightly different manor.  
Under the Kennedy administration there was a whole of government overt effort 
to affect Chilean politics. Kennedy’s PW effort in Chile followed the template 
established in Italy from 1946 to 1948 with one exception; no overt non-communist 
government stipulations placed on U.S. aid. The lack of effort placed on affecting the 
social construct in promoting U.S. economic aid with stipulations limiting the communist 
influence in Chile’s government, limited the effectiveness of creating broad social change 
processes to favor U.S. interests. Kennedy’s balanced PW approach used covert measure 
to reinforce the overt effort in Chile’s 1964 presidential election.  
The Johnson administrations PW effort was not balanced. Economic and military 
aid increased through Johnson’s presidency but the DOS and CIA efforts to influence 
Chilean politics through the social construct or opportunity and threat were mismatched 
with the effort to create broad social change. The mismatch caused the PW strategy to fail 
to keep Chile’s Communist and Socialist Party from controlling government in 1970.  
The Nixon administration PW effort highlights an effective strategy from 1971–
1973 with an initial failure in the 1970 presidential election. The Nixon administration 
failed to recognize the changing political situation leading to the Chile’s 1970 election. 
There was no effort to support a specific political party for president in opposition to 
Allende. The political warfare effort focused almost completely on the social construct 
through covert, indirect and covert, direct methods. By failing in efforts to mobilize voter 
support for an opposition party to the Popular Unity coalition prior to the election, the 
Nixon administration resorted to drastic measures in Track I and Track II efforts. Both 
PW efforts failed to achieve the objective in the timeframe expected.  
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The Nixon administration’s PW effort from 1971–1973 was a whole of 
government approach. Department of State and DOD efforts complemented the CIA’s 
covert strategy. The PW effort to manipulate contained contention within Chile failed to 
achieve the desired results in the 1973 congressional election. Having failed in contained 
contention, the PW effort shifted to transgressive contention by supporting the Chilean 
military in an Allende government coup. Ultimately the U.S. political objective was 
achieved through DOD’s overt and covert direct efforts to appropriate the Chilean 
military. DOD’s use of overt military aid and training enable the covert PW strategy. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: POLITICAL WARFARE— 
A MILITARY IMPERATIVE 
The purpose of this thesis was to identify DOD’s contribution to political warfare 
during the Cold War to help identify areas for increased Department of Defense 
involvement in the planning, development, and practice of political warfare in today’s 
environment. Three research questions were proposed.  
(1) How does DOD involvement in political warfare strategy and practice 
affect U.S. PW objectives?  
The case studies show the Department of Defense involvement in political 
warfare strategy and practice affects U.S. PW objectives by supporting Department of 
State and CIA political warfare efforts. DOD efforts tend to reinforce the security 
apparatus of the political entities supported by other agencies. Using resources and 
training assistance, DOD PW efforts increase the political opposition’s perception of 
threat, which decreases their collective action mobilization potential. In the event 
political action fails to achieve the intended objective, DOD’s political warfare efforts 
provide each agency a secondary course of action to achieve the intended objective. DOD 
efforts to appropriate the security apparatus in favor of U.S. objectives assures that 
military and security leaders become political allies in the event of a coup or overthrow 
of the political system. In overt and covert action, the DOD’s primary PW role is to 
provide the resources and training in the mobilization processes of social or 
organizational appropriation. DOD’s primary role is followed by secondary efforts aimed 
at influencing the opportunity and threat field of the CPM model. 
DOD actions can support political warfare objectives in a number of ways. In the 
Italy case the Department of Defense was instrumental in establishing a new Italian 
government. DOD was able to appoint political leaders of its choosing, assist in the 
drafting of a new constitution and government, as well as provide resources and training 
to the security apparatus to support and enforce the new system. Prior to transferring 
control of government, DOD’s political warfare strategy was focused on removing the 
fascist party and winning the war against Germany. DOD could have set the political 
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conditions to favor U.S. influence by limiting the political power of the Communist and 
Socialist Parties during DOD’s control of the transitional government. Had there been 
political warfare training within DOD, military officers could have recognized the 
political atmosphere and foreseen a future political threat within the parties of the CLN.  
In the Chilean case, DOD played an enabling role to the political warfare strategy 
of the other U.S. agencies. DOD’s support and social appropriation of Chile’s military 
provided the opportunity for the CIA to influence the overthrow of the Allende 
government. DOD was used as an overt tool of political warfare that easily transitioned to 
the covert manipulation of military leaders. DOD’s versatility and perceived benign 
connection to political warfare make it an ideal source for use in political warfare 
strategy.  
(2) How can expanding the DOD’s role in political warfare increase the 
available policy options for today’s decision makers?  
DOD is a distinctive agency in its ability to easily operate in overt and covert 
political warfare spheres. This dual capability strongly supports a greater role for the 
Department of Defense in PW strategy development and practice. Expanding the DOD’s 
role in political warfare increases the available policy options for today’s decision 
makers. In today’s environment, DOD is used to break an established political system 
and then used to rebuild the system according to perceived democratic principles as seen 
most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD’s understanding of political warfare and the 
processes involved in broad social change, political opportunity and threat, the social 
construct, and mobilization within organizational and social appropriation will help 
military planners rebuild a political system to favor U.S. interests. However, the political 
environment of the target must first be understood and a political warfare plan must be in 
place prior to DOD involvement in breaking the system. Understanding a political 
environment and the political warfare plan will help DOD shape the political 
environment during the breakdown and rebuild process.  
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(3) What are some ways the DOD can support political warfare and its 
objectives?  
Increasing DOD involvement in the development of political warfare policy 
would require that military leaders understand and study the disciplines of political 
warfare, both overt and covert. Educating military officers in political warfare strategy 
and methods will equip them to advise policymakers on alternative courses of action, 
especially when military coercion is deemed inappropriate to a political objective. The 
Department of Defense should develop a PW military specialist that understands the 
range of actions available and when to implement them in a political environment. The 
specialist would provide an informed political perspective to conventional commanders, 
supporting effective, multidimensional military strategies towards a strategic objective. 
Politically informed military leaders can shape a target’s political environment during 
conventional wars to better prepare for the transition to political warfare strategies. The 
active engagement of the Department of Defense in the development of political warfare 
strategy enables military leaders to fully grasp the political objectives. The increased 
understanding gained from developing these strategies ensures that military strategies in 
the conduct of war correspond with political intent and that military strategies short of 
war prevent political warfare from escalating to conventional war. 
(4) Political Warfare and the Contentious Politics Mobilization Model  
This study identified the contentious politics mobilization model’s utility in 
describing, developing, and planning political warfare strategy. It also proposed using the 
polity model and the political warfare spectrum as tools to evaluate the political space 
and determine the ways political warfare actions could be conducted. The ability to 
influence group collective action was determined to be the primary way to achieve a 
political warfare objective. The processes that influence collective action were identified 
in the contentious politics mobilization (CPM) model as broad social change processes, 
political opportunities and threats, the social construct, and social or organizational 
appropriation. The adapted CPM model also provides an area for evaluation and outcome 
prediction that was used in the case studies to evaluate the effectiveness of a PW strategy. 
The use of the models together provides a starting point for DOD’s development of a 
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political warfare methodology that uses social movement theory models as the 
foundational framework. The application of the models proved to be effective in 
describing U.S. political warfare conducted in democratic forms of government. Future 
thesis research should evaluate the models application to PW in other forms of 
government, tribal systems, and un-governed societies.  
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APPENDIX A.  SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
A. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES 
This study selected McAdam’s political-process model as a key element in 
studying group collective action processes for use in political warfare. This selection was 
based on the political-process model’s broad integration of different levels of social 
analysis and its use of structural and social-constructivist study approaches. Social 
movement theories can be organized according to three levels of analysis: the micro, 
meso, and macro. Stephen Engel describes the micro level as focused on the individual. 
Micro-level social movement theories provide explanations as to why people participate 
in social movements. The meso level focuses on the group or organization by explaining 
how social movements gain the resources to participate in collective action. The macro-
level analysis provides external and institutional explanations influencing collective 
action, indicating when a group or individual can participate in social movements.209  
To visualize where the predominant social movement theories fit, Stephen Engel 
developed a graphical construct to differentiate the various social movement theories by 
their level of analysis and approach, as seen in Figure 14.210 Figure 14 indicates the 
political-process model as the only social movement theory that incorporates all three 
analytical levels, and therefore provides the most inclusive explanation of collective 
action.  
Besides incorporating all three levels of analysis, the political-process model 
includes both structural and constructivist approaches. Generally speaking, social 
movement scholars focus either on structural or social constructivist approaches. The 
structural approach tries to explain social movements through external and internal 
environmental processes.211 Structural approaches “focus on the distribution of material 
                                                 
209 Engel, The Unfinished Revolution, 14. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Jacquelien Van Stekelenburg and Bert Klanderm, “Social Movement Theory: Past, Present and 
Prospects” In Movers and Shakers: Social Movements in Africa, ed. Stephen Ellis and Ineke van Kessel, 
African Dynamics 8 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2009), 18, 
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/18530/ASC-075287668-1735-01.pdf?sequence=2. 
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resources and the organization or institutions that govern such distribution.”212 The 
social-constructivist perspective concentrates on how individuals and groups perceive 
and interpret conditions within their environment. Constructivists focus on the cognitive, 
psychological, cultural, and affective aspects that lead to political contention.213 
McAdam’s political-process model provides the most inclusive framework for 
understanding the collective action processes of a social movement by providing both 
structural and constructivist perspectives.   
 
Figure 14.  Social Movement Theory Organization214 
B. THE POLITICAL-PROCESS MODEL 
McAdam identifies three key processes necessary for social movement 
development by looking at the internal characteristics inherent to the movement’s 
preparation for collective action. The basic processes involved in the political-process 
                                                 
212 Jackie Smith and Tina Fetner in Handbook of Social Movements across Disciplines, Handbooks of 
Sociology and Social Research (New York: Springer, 2010), 13. 
213 Van Stekelenburg and Klanderm, Movers and Shakers, 18–19. 
214 Stephen M. Engel, The Unfinished Revolution: Social Movement Theory and the Gay and Lesbian 
Movement, Cambridge Cultural Social Studies (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2001). 
A= Classical Approach 
B= Rational Choice 
C= Resource Mobilization 
D= New Social Movement 












model provide the intellectual foundation from which McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow 
develop the Contentious politics mobilization model. The CPM model expands the 
collective action explanations of McAdam’s political-process model by incorporating 
them into a dynamic political setting of competing organizations. The CPM model is the 
lens this study uses to evaluate PW actions by where and how they influence a target’s 
political setting. Understanding the foundational characteristics presented in the political-
process model provides insights into the dynamic interactions involved in the CPM 
model.  
The political-process model is important to a political warfare actor because it 
identifies the essential components and processes for group collective action. An actor’s 
understanding of the internal characteristics of a social movement helps him identify the 
areas that can be manipulate to assist or suppress group collective action. An 
understanding of the underlying processes allows the actor to develop strategies using a 
social movement and collective action as the means to a political warfare objective.  
Social movement experts Van Stekelenburg and Klanderm provide a useful 
description of how the political process model is interpreted: 
In general, the political process approach argues that the ebb and flow of 
movement activity is related to the opening up and closure of political 
opportunities. Protesters are rational, instrumental, polity-oriented people 
who seize opportunities by lobbying and forming coalitions with political 
elites. Cognitive liberation proposes that the subjectivity of actors makes 
resources usable and collective action viable. It helps actors and groups 
frame their situation as unjust and liable to change.215 
The political-process model has three critical, interrelated fields of enquiry 
necessary for the successful development of a social movement.216 The first area is 
changing opportunity structure, which McAdam developed from an understanding of the 
political opportunity-structure theory first proposed by Peter Eisinger in the macro-level 
                                                 
215 Van Stekelenburg and Klanderm, Movers and Shakers, 28. 
216 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970, 2nd ed 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 40. 
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analysis.217 The second field is pre-existing organizational strength, based on McAdam’s 
understanding of McCarthy and Zald’s resource-mobilization theory in meso-level 
analysis.218 The final component is the psychological process of cognitive liberation, a 
concept developed by McAdam that incorporates processes from rational-choice theory 
and the classical approach in the micro-level analysis. McAdam’s combination of micro, 
meso, and macro analysis provides a comprehensive theoretical explanation for how, 
when, and why social movement organizations emerge. 
The political-process model has become the predominant method for studying and 
analyzing the emergence of a social movement. The next section explains how 
McAdam’s political process model is interpreted by expounding upon the component 
processes that distinguish the model. Understanding the processes behind the political-
process model simplifies the dynamic explanation of the CPM model used in the case 
study. 
1. Broad Socioeconomic Processes 
McAdam illustrates the workings of the political process model through the four 
processes shown in Figure 15. 
                                                 
217 Peter K. Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities,” American Political 
Science Review 67, no. 1 (March 1973): 11, doi:10.2307/1958525. 
218 John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial 
Theory,” American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (May 1, 1977): 1212–41, doi:10.2307/2777934. 
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Figure 15.  McAdam’s Political-Process Model219 
At the left of the Figure 15 are broad socioeconomic processes—any social or 
economic influence over an extended period of time that has a broad impact within a 
political setting. The arrow pointing up from broad socioeconomic processes illustrates 
the effect they have on strengthening or weakening a political system. The strength or 
weakness of the political system can either create or close opportunities for opposition 
groups to influence the political establishment. An example of the process is how a strong 
economy can strengthen the political system by providing the resources necessary to 
suppress an opposition group. Conversely, weak economies lead to fewer resources on 
which a government can rely. The inability to suppress an opposition creates or expands 
the opportunities for an opposition group to influence the political situation. 
Another example of broad socioeconomic processes is the psychological effect 
international perception has on a political establishment. The perceptions of the 
international arena are broad social processes that can influence the actions of an 
established political entity. This influence then limits the available actions a political 
body can take, which could create opportunities for an opposition group to challenge the 
government.  
                                                 
219 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, 2nd ed 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).  Modified adding illustration of structural potential, 
mobilizing structures and framing process.   
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The lower arrow of Figure 15, pointing from broad socioeconomic processes, 
indicates the effect of broad social processes on organizational strength. Broad social 
processes like migration or overpopulation provide an increase in the human-resource 
base from which mobilization can occur. Broad socioeconomic processes, such as the 
type of economy an area is reliant upon or the cultural diversity of a given system, affect 
the type and strength of the organizational structures that are available for group 
mobilization and collective action. For example, the presence of trade unions in an 
industrial society provides organizational structures or networks that lower the barriers 
for implementing collective action; in tribal societies, these structures exist along tribal 
lines or coalitions.  
The effects that socioeconomic process have on expanding political opportunities 
or threats and indigenous organizational strength, increases or decreases the potential for 
a social movement to emerge. Structural potential is indicated by the up– down arrow at 
the center of Figure 15. McAdam describes structural potential as a group’s realization 
and evaluation of opportunities and threats in their political environment. Indigenous 
organizational strength must be perceived as strong enough to overcome possible threats. 
Political opportunities must also be present for the insurgent or challenger organization, 
and this potential must be transformed into collective action by means of cognitive 
liberation.220 “All three factors (organizational strength, political opportunity, cognitive 
liberation) are regarded as necessary, but alone insufficient, to cause the emergence of a 
social insurgency.”221 The following subsections explain the individual components that 
are unique to McAdam’s political-process model explanations for collective action in a 
social movement. 
2. Political Opportunity and Threat 
The second component of the political-process model in Figure 15 is political 
opportunities and threats, which occur within a defined political system and are a 
function of domestic capacity. Domestic capacity allows states to define their political 
                                                 
220 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970, 48–51. 
221 Ibid., 51. 
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interests and enforce decisions, thereby controlling potential protest.222 Social movement 
experts Craig Jenkins and Bert Klanderman’s, whose work focuses on political-
opportunity structures, cite domestic capacity as the strength of a political system. Their 
work identifies four variables that contribute to the strength of domestic capacity:  
1. Despotic control—the ability to maintain domestic order through 
repression 
2. Infrastructure capacity—a state’s ability to mobilize labor and financial 
resources 
3. Administrative and rule-making capacity— associated with governmental 
structure, degree of administrative centralization, and civil-service 
professionalism  
4. International support— supplementation of the three variables223  
“These variables allow states to define political interest and to enforce decisions, 
thereby controlling protest.”224 Opportunities occur in the shifting relationships among 
variables: as state capacity decreases, opportunity for social movements increases.  
To differentiate McAdam’s concept of opportunities and threats in the political-
process model from Eisner et al.’s political-opportunity structure theory, McAdam 
proposes that a state’s capacity need not decrease for opportunities to occur. McAdam 
explains: 
Regardless of whether the broad social processes serve to undermine the 
structural basis of the entire political system or simply to enhance the 
strategic position of a single challenger, the result is the same: a net 
increase in the political leverage exercised by insurgent groups. Increased 
political leverage improves the bargaining position of the insurgent group 
thus creating new opportunities for the collective pursuit of group goals. 
This improved bargaining position raises significantly the costs of 
repressing insurgent actions. The increase in political power of the 
insurgent group also encourages collective action by diminishing the risks 
associated with movement participation.225 
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224 Ibid. 
225 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970, 43. 
 118 
McAdam expands the original concepts provided by political-opportunity 
structure theory by incorporating processes from rational-choice theory and resource-
mobilization theory. The fusion of these concepts elevates the political-process model’s 
collective action explanations over competing theories of social movement and collective 
action. 
3. Organizational Strength  
The third process in the Figure 15 model is insurgent organizational strength. The 
components that make up organizational strength are mobilization structures, cultural 
strength, communications networks, and leaders.226 The four variables contribute to a 
social movement’s organizational strength, affecting its ability to mobilize.  
a. Mobilization Structures 
In McAdam’s model, the mobilizing structure resides in the human networks of 
the indigenous organizations present in the political space. These organizational 
structures form the base from which two types of member recruitment occurs. The first 
type is at the micro level, through individual ties within existing indigenous 
organizations. The recruited individuals go on to form new social ties that result in the 
development of a new social movement organization. The second type of recruitment is 
at the meso level, through the bloc recruitment of an entire group or organization. The 
recruited groups or organizations form coalitions that result in the development of the 
new social movement organization.227  
b. Cultural Strength 
The second component in organizational strength is cultural strength, which is 
gained through solidarity incentives and the communication networks of members within 
the social movement. Solidarity incentives are those interpersonal rewards that provide 
                                                 
226 Bob Edwards and John McCarthy, “Resources and Social Movement Mobilization” In The 
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motive for participation in an established organization. The importance of these rewards 
helps explain why recruitment through established networks is so efficient.228 Solidarity 
incentives help resolve the free-rider problem associated with the rational-choice model. 
The free-rider problem in the rational choice model refers to an individual receiving the 
benefit of group collective action without having to pay any of the costs. If benefits can 
be received without any costs, there is no incentive to engage in collective action. 
c. Communications Networks  
The third component is communication networks, described as the inter-
organizational linkages characteristic of established groups. These communication links 
disseminate an ideology throughout an aggrieved population, contributing to the 
emergence of a social movement.229 Cultural diffusion and adoption happens along the 
same communications networks and infrastructures. The strength and range of the 
network determines the pattern, speed, and extent of movement and expansion.230  
d. Leaders 
The final component in organizational strength is leadership. Social movement 
leaders provide centralized direction and coordination to help diffuse and actualize ideas 
into collective action. Leaders frame group situations and organize collective action by 
leveraging organizational strengths to exploit political opportunities. McAdam points out 
that the four variables of organizational strength are interrelated. “The established 
organizations within the movement’s mass base insure the presence of recognized leaders 
who can be called upon to lend their prestige and organizing skills to the incipient 
movement.”231 A leader’s ability to frame a group’s situation as unjust and subject to 
change contributes to the final process in the political-process model: cognitive 
liberation.   
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4. Cognitive Liberation 
Cognitive liberation in Figure 15 is a subjective process that takes place within 
the minds of a given population. McAdam believes a social movement’s emergence 
depends on whether an aggrieved group recognizes and collectively defines its situation 
as unjust and susceptible to change through group action. The likelihood that cognitive 
liberation will occur depends on whether existing political opportunities can trigger the 
process by supplying the necessary cognitive cues to individuals within an 
organization.232  
McAdam describes cognitive cues as shifts in the interpretation of existing 
conditions, as perceived by members and challengers. When cognitive cues are 
interpreted in favor of a challenger, members within the polity will display an increase in 
symbolic responsiveness to insurgent or challenger actions. This increase in 
responsiveness by polity members indicates an increase in insurgent bargaining power 
and exposes potential vulnerabilities within the political structure. The likelihood that 
cognitive cues trigger cognitive liberation is directly related to the strength of the 
integrative ties within a movement’s mass base.233 In other words, the greater the 
solidarity of a group, the greater the likelihood it will be cognizant of the signals that 
exist within the social construct. This awareness will then increase the likelihood that a 
group will accept, recognize, and engage in collective action as a means of political or 
social change.   
Frances Piven and Richard Cloward describe three attributes associated with 
group consciousness and cognitive liberation. The political system or aspects of the 
system must first lose legitimacy. Populations that ordinarily accept a state’s authority 
and the legitimacy of institutional arrangements must come to believe they are unjust and 
wrong. The second attribute of cognitive liberation is when people who ordinarily believe 
that the existing arrangements are inevitable begin to assert rights and demand change. 
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The final attribute is when people who ordinarily consider themselves helpless come to 
believe they are capable of changing their situation.234 
A new field of study called the “framing process” advances the study of cognitive 
liberation by explaining the rhetorical processes groups use to define their situation, 
create a social identity, provide solutions, and produce group action. Snow and Benford 
are the leading scholars on framing social movements. Their research identifies three 
framing tasks. The first is the diagnostic frame, focusing on problem identification and 
attribution. The second is the prognostic frame, which identifies a clear solution and a 
means for implementation. The third is the motivational frame, which inspires people to 
act.235 McAdam’s cognitive liberation focuses on the individual sense of empowerment 
prior to involvement. The framing processes emphasizes the more strategic decisions 
achieved at a higher organizational level as an ongoing dynamic process. At minimum, a 
group needs to describe its grievances persuasively in the diagnostic frame and present a 
feasible solution within the prognostic frame.236 A movement or organization then enacts 
the feasible suggestions of the prognostic frame by engaging in collective action. The 
type of collective action a movement or group uses is a product of a group’s repertoire of 
contention. 
5. Collective Action  
Collective action in the political-process model is the culmination of a social 
movement’s development, political opportunities and threats, group organizational 
strength, and cognitive liberation. McAdam observes that when a social movement 
engages in collective action, it uses the tactics available for insurgent communication. 
The social movement’s tactics vary by the degree to which their actions threaten other 
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organized groups in the political environment.237 Tactics can pursue either 
institutionalized or non-institutionalized mechanisms for conflict resolution. In the 
political-process model, McAdam focuses on a social movement’s use of non-
institutionalized, collective action tactics, believing that they challenge elite power 
groups by rejecting the established, institutional mechanisms for conflict resolution—thus 
depriving elites of their dominant institutional power.238  
The variables contributing to McAdam’s political-process model—broad social-
change processes, political opportunities and threats, cognitive liberation, framing, and 
group collective action—are each essential in achieving political change. The 
Contentious politics mobilization model understands the political environment as 
comprising many social movement organizations, with actors inside and outside of the 
government. These organizations and actors are competing or collaborating with each 
other, either to maintain the status quo or seek political change.  
The CPM model adapts two of McAdam’s political-process models, one for the 
challenger and one for the member, and places them in a dynamic, interactive political 
environment of competition. The resulting interaction resolves the more static single-
actor explanations provided by the original political-process model and broadens the field 
of study to incorporate dynamic process for multiple types of contention.239 The new 
construct recognizes that all types of politics operate through similar interactive processes 
between member, challengers, and subjects.240  
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APPENDIX B.  PROMINENT ITALIAN POLITICAL PARTIES IN 
THE 1946–1948 ELECTIONS 
1. The Italian Socialist Party (PSI)  
The Italian Socialist Party of the late 1940’s was a party of two ideologies: half 
believed in the revolutionary struggle of the middle class and half believed in gradual 
social change realized within the framework of a parliamentary system.241 Originally 
formed in 1892, the Socialist Party came to be one of the largest political parties in Italy 
by 1919, splitting in 1921 to form two separate parties, the PCI and the PSI. Mussolini, 
fearing a socialist revolution, eliminated the PSI and PCI from government in 1926. In 
exile, the PSI and PCI formed a Unity of Action Pact that vowed to undermine Fascism.  
When the Spanish civil war broke out in 1936, and Mussolini sent Italian 
troops to help Franco, the Italian Socialist and Communists joined the 
Spanish Republic fighting together in the International Brigades. Their 
wartime experience and collaboration against fascism cemented the 
relationship between the two parties.242  
Leaders from the PSI and PCI participated in the Spanish civil war, gaining 
valuable war-fighting experience, support, and legitimacy, which would later prove 
invaluable in the WWII partisan resistance in northern Italy seven years later. The PSI 
organized its supporters through trade unions of the Italian General Confederation of 
Labor (CGIL) and the Italian Labor Union (UIL).243 The PSI was able to use existing 
organizational structures within the union as a base for political support. This gave the 
political party the structural tools needed to organize and mobilize resources for political 
purposes.  
2. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) 
The Italian Communist Party, with the support of the Soviet Union, was the only 
party able to maintain a limited underground organization in Italy during the fascist 
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regime.244 Before the armistice agreement, the PCI capitalized on its underground 
networks within the Italian Confederation of Labor (CGIL) trade unions to instigate 
factory strikes in Milan and Turin during March and April of 1943. These orchestrated, 
open revolts were the first mass protests against Italian fascism since its inception. The 
overt strikes and the absence of oppression from the government signaled its declining 
power over the Italian population.245 The existing underground networks of the PCI, 
coupled with their revolutionary ideology, military experience, and financial support 
from the Soviet Union, enabled the party to become a prominent force within the partisan 
resistance of northern Italy.246 The PCI’s continuous presence within Italy allowed them 
to capitalize on changing events, giving them the early advantage in organizing a strong 
base of support within the trade unions of northern, central, and southern Italy. After 
northern Italy was liberated in 1945, the PCI had over two million active members.247 
The PCI, having been introduced by the United States into powerful positions within the 
newly established Italian government, became dominant within the coalition and began 
shaping, as well as undermining, the evolving Italian political system for its own 
advantage.  
3. Christian Democrats 
The Christian Democrats (DC) began in 1943, with members that were remnants 
of the Populist Party outlawed in 1926. The Catholic Church in Rome was the original 
supporter of the Populist Party, and subsequently the Christian Democrats. The Vatican, 
fearing that socialism and communism would gain increasing political ground after 
fascism, established a political force that Italian Catholics could rally behind in 
opposition to the revolutionary and antireligious movements of competing parties.248 
Unfortunately, almost none of the political support structure of the Populist Party 
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remained intact during the fascist dictatorship. As a result, the Christian Democrats 
lacked an established political machine at its formation, which left the DC weak as 
compared to the established political force of the PSI and PCI at the time.249 
The DC would have to appropriate existing organizational structures within 
Italian society to reconstitute its organization, capitalizing on semi-political bodies 
associated with the Church.250 The most powerful Catholic organization was Catholic 
Action (CA), which consisted of six smaller social organizations sustained by the 
Catholic Church: the Italian Federation of Catholic Men (IFCM), the Ancient Society of 
Youth (ASY), the University Student Federation (FUCI), the Italian Feminist 
Organization (IFO), the Italian Catholic Young Women (GF), and the girls’ branch of the 
FUCI (FUCIG). The parish council, diocesan committee, and central committee of the 
Italy Action Committee (ACI) coordinated the efforts of the various CA organizations.251 
Additionally, the Christian Democrats helped organize support by using the lower clergy 
at the parish level, in the form of civic committees.252 Other organizations associated 
with the Catholic Church included trade unions such as the Christian Association of 
Italian Workers (ACLI), the Italian Confederation of Workers’ Trade Unions (CISL), and 
the Coldiretti, also known as the Federation of Italian Farmers (FIF).253 Using the 
Church as a launching pad, the Christian Democrats soon emerged as the most powerful 
of the parties in the CLN. The appropriation of existing structures within the Church 
allowed the Christian Democrats to organize a base of support and gain valuable 
resources for future political mobilization.  
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